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INTRODUCTION 
I Since nuclear weapons were first constructed, nations have 
i been attempting to discover a way to control their destructiveness. The first such attempt was engineered by J. 
~1 1 Robert Oppenheimer, the founder of the atomic bomb, in the form I 
I,
 
of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. This report was the basis for
 
. \	 the Baruch Plan, which was a disarmament proposal presented by 
Bernard Baruch to the United Nations in the late 1940s. The 
t 
I proposal was rejected because it called for international control 
of fissionable materials, which was considered a violation of 
national sovereignty by the Soviet Union. The character of arms 
I control negotiations has changed significantly since the 1940s 
and 505. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the focus of arms control
Ii shifted from disarmament to strategic arms limitation, with an 
emphasis on bilateralism (National Academy of Sciences 1985:3;
.1'
-' Schoenbaum 1987:30). 
I This paper will examine the factors which influence arms 
control from a historical perspective. Of primary interest are 
I bilateral negotiations on strategic arms, starting in 1969 with 
I the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although specific treaties must be 
Ii examined in order to illustrate the manner in which particular 
I 
factors may operate, the primary focus of this discussion will be 
J limited to arms control negotiations at a theoretical level. It 
is the intent of this paper to provide a comprehensive 
I	 1 
I, 
I 
I 
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I 
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I 
examination of the variables which act upon the arms control 
process without providing an in-depth analysis of anyone 
variable. This paper will illustrate the influence of the actors 
who formulate arms control, and the political environment 
surrounding negotiations, in order to provide an understanding of 
how arms control treaties are shaped. 
GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS 
Presidential variables 
Political affiliation. On its face, the political party 
affiliation of the president may appear to be a factor which 
influences the arms control process. In practice, as this paper 
will suggest, there are a variety of variables which constrain 
the power of individual actors to shape arms control to their 
personal preferences. Kegley and Wittkopf explain: 
Change the people who make the policy, and the policy 
itself will probably change, so one view has it. 
However, perusal of this theory and corresponding 
evidence ... has shown us that this tenet is not 
persuasive. Kissinger's hypothesis that it really 
doesn't make a difference who 
essential outlines of foreign 
same regardless--appears more 
seen, the system recruits the 
into positions of power. And 
posts are frequented by many 
over time, according to a 
is elected president--the 
policy will remain the 
cogent. Why? As we have 
same types of individuals 
top-level decision-making 
of the same individuals 
revolving door principle. 
The 
Moreover, once in office individuals tend to be shaped 
by, more than they are able to shape, the roles they 
occupy. As a result, individual differences tend to be 
cancelled out: new decision makers act like and reach 
the same kinds of decisions as their predecessors 
(1987:551-1). 
theory espoused by Kegley and Wittkopf indicates that 
individuals are shaped by the roles they fill. This would 
2 
I 
I suggest that the political affiliation of an individual 
president, over the long term, would have no real effect on 
I her/his arms control policy choices. 
I 
I In the realm of arms control since 1969, it is difficult to 
t 
ascertain the role of political party affiliation on arms control 
in a way which does not involve theory. Lyndon Johnson was only 
in office for a brief time, during which no substantive arms 
I control negotiations were conducted. Eight years later, carter,a 
Democrat president, surfaced for four years; then the country was 
I 
I once again under Republican rule for eight years in the form of 
Reagan. Because there has only been one presidential term (out 
of a possible five) in which a Democrat was in office, the sample 
I size is inadequate to draw any valid conclusions which would 
correlate political party with a successful negotiating posture. 
I 
I A more realistic approach, discussed in the contents of this 
paper, is to construct a framework of interacting variables which 
may help to determine under which circumstances arms control, in 
I a general sense, is feasibl~. 
I 
Transition time. When assessing the factors. which affect an 
I exective's conduct of foreign policy, it is important to include 
transition time. The term "transition" has been used in various 
ways by different authors. Mosher identifies the most frequent 
I use of the term as the period of approximately eleven weeks 
I 
between the presidential election and the inauguration (1987:35). 
I However, when looking at the effects of a presidential transition 
on policy, it is more accurate to use a broader interpretation of 
I 3 
I 
I 
I the term. Even after inauguration, a new president is not able 
to immediately implement the policy of his or her choice (if such 
I a choice has been made). Several prerequisites are necessary: 
I the making and confirmation of major political appointments; the development and implementation of programs which support the 
.' 
established policies; appropriate budget planning; and, the 
forming of relations with members of the legislature to aid in 
I the implementation of the programs (Mosher et.al. 1987:35). 
When these prerequisites are included, the broader definition of 
I 
I transition time may encompass up to as much as a year and a half 
of time lost in formulating a new president's approach to foreign 
policy (Mosher et.al. 1987:37). Additionally, because of the 
I' disruptive nature of an upcoming election year, a president may 
lose some of his or her ability to conduct policy in the manner 
I 
I in which s/he chooses. If this additional disruptive force is 
entered into the calculation of transition time, it may be that 
only two years out of a four-year presidential term may prove to 
I be productive in terms of policy-making (Miller 1984:85). 
Transition time is a relevant factor affecting arms control 
.'
I' negotiations because, as Mosher notes, " ...major undertakings, 
such as a SALT treaty or a Panama Canal treaty, often require 
more than four years to develop, negotiate, and ratify" 
.' 
(1987:43). Goldberger indicates that the transition time lost 
I 
due to the electoral process may affect long-range planning in 
I arms control (1988:69). The specific nature of these effects 
should be evaluated to assess the significance of transition time 
I 4 
I 
I 
I to arms control. 
One of the most important effects of a presidential 
I transition is the shift in strategy and posture of foreign 
I policy, particularly if the transition is from one political 
I 
party to another (Mosher et.al. 1987:33). Diehl notes that a new 
leader often takes time out to review his or her predecessor's 
policies and to make alterations (1987:11). In most cases, 
I newly-elected leaders wish to make their own personal mark on 
policy, and this may entail changes in bureaucratic personnel and 
I 
I negotiating teams (Sloss and Davis 1987:35). The manner in which 
a new president attempts to adjust arms control policy to his or 
her own expectations may take one of several forms: a delay in 
I negotiations to reassess the options; an immediate alteration in 
arms control policy; and, continuation of the policies of the 
I 
I preceding president with minimal reevaluation. 
Often new leaders need to take time upon entering office to 
"overcome the instinct to substantially repudiate the policies of 
I their predecessors, to study the issues anew from their own 
perspectives, to organize the policy machinery, and to formulate 
I 
I their own policies" (Miller 1984:85). This was the approach 
taken by President Nixon in 1969. He put the SALT negotiations 
which had started with the Johnson administration on hold to 
I study the prOblem, review the options, and consult NATO allies 
(Schoenbaum 1987:35; Frye 1974:78; Miller 1984:85). Although
I Nixon was not opposed to the eventual adoption of Johnson's 
I policies on SALT, he demanded the presentation of as many options 
I 
5 
I 
I 
I as possible, and looked with particular suspicion upon those 
prepared by the bureaucracy (Frye 1974:79). This extensive 
I evaluation of SALT policy served to delay the progress of 
negotiations. Although this approach may enhance the prospectsI 
I 
for arms control in the long run, in the short run it serves as 
an impediment to the negotiating progress. 
Another possible effect of the transition period is a 
I radical shift in policy attempted shortly after the inauguration 
of the new president. Diehl notes that this type of alteration 
I 
I in policy is one characteristic of leadership change (1987:11). 
This approach was exemplified by President Carter. While 
attempting to avoid a delay in the negotiating process, the 
I Carter administration at the same time chose to present an 
ambitious comprehensive proposal in March of 1977 (Miller 
I 
I 1984:85). This approach failed for several reasons: Carter did 
not understand the extent to which Brezhnev was committed to the 
Vladivostok proposal as a result of his bargaining with Nixon, 
I Ford, and with the Politburo (Mosher et.al. 1987:211); Carter did 
not anticipate the suspicion with which the Soviet Union regarded 
I 
I the public manner in which the new proposal was presented (Mosher 
et.al. 1987:211); the members of the Soviet establishment were 
testing the willpower of the new administration (Talbott 
I 1979:75); and, the Soviets were offended at Carter's naive 
I 
assumption that he could continue SALT negotiations while at the 
I same time criticizing the Soviet Union on human rights abuses 
(Talbott 1979:75). Diehl concludes that Carter's decision to 
I 6 
I 
I 
I surprise the Soviet Union with a new SALT II proposal halted the 
progress of the negotiations for at least a year (1987:12). 
I Carter was eventually able to conclude the SALT II negotiations 
on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement reached by PresidentI 
I 
Ford in 1974 (Lodal 1988:153). This example seems to indicate 
that arms control negotiations are not enhanced by sudden shifts 
in policy during the transition time of a new administration. 
I The process of arms control appears to be aided by 
continuity in policy. The bureaucratic inertia encountered when 
I 
I dealing with opponents who have become committed to an 
established proposal is best changed by increments, not sudden 
change. Radical shifts in arms control policy due to leadership 
I changes in the U.S. have not benefitted the negotiating process, 
as Carter's experience demonstrates. Additionally, when new 
I 
I administrations force significant delays in negotiations, these 
negotiations are obviously not fruitful during that time. It is 
possible to avoid the complications caused by a presidential 
I transition when a president is reelected and makes no significant 
policy changes, when an important member of the previous 
I 
I administration is elected to the presidency and attempts to 
continue past policies, or when a new administration chooses to 
appoint some of the key figures of the past administration to 
I their former posts in the negotiating process. Mosher notes that 
"Kissinger drew heavily on personnel from the State Department,
I the Defense Department, and the CIA in building the national 
I security advisor's staff. Since these individuals had served in 
I 7 
I 
I 
I the Johnson administration, they provided a substantial amount of 
continuity as well as expertise" (1987:196). 
I 
I Continuity is difficult to establish in a political system 
in which elections for the presidency are held every four years. 
I 
This problem is compounded by legislative elections occurrinng 
every two years, changing the composition both at the onset of a 
new administration and also during its term. Even if a leader is 
I reelected, control of the legislature by a different political 
party may undermine the continuity of arms control policy (Diehl 
I 
I 1987:12). Because changes in policy are disruptive to the arms 
control negotiating process, elections in the legislature may 
impose transition time problems on the executive branch. 
I There is a tendency among newly-elected leaders to take 
agressive positions toward the Soviet Union due to pressure to 
I 
I conform to campaign rhetoric, the desire not to be seen as "soft" 
on communism, and often as a result of personal convictions 
(Mosher et.al. 1987:32). This has been exemplified by the 
I rhetoric and actions of President Reagan. Reagan dismissed the 
SALT II treaty of the previous Carter administration as "fatally 
I 
I flawed," made unflattering statements about the nature and aims 
of the Soviet Union, refused to negotiate with the Soviet Union 
until new military expenditures put the U.S. in a position of 
I strength, and appointed arms control critic Eugene Rostow to head 
the ACDA (Van Cleave 1984:14; Brown 1987:178). This ideology of 
I 
I anti-communism is itself inimical to arms control negotiations. 
During his first term in office, Reagan made no substantial gains 
I 8 
I 
I 
I in the arms control arena. Mosher notes that those presidents 
who were initially hostile toward the Soviet Union who were 
I reelected to a second term (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan) began 
I their second terms on less agressive themes (1987:33). Although 
I 
there is no indication that the tendency to project an aggressive 
attitude toward the Soviet Union will manifest itself in every 
leader, it is apparent that when it does occur, it inhibits the 
I negotiating process (although if the leader is reelected it is 
less likely to be a strong theme). 
I 
I The final complication of the transition process is the 
absence of competent advisement for the newly-elected president. 
This occurs because inexperienced appointees may need time to 
I familiarize themselves with foreign policy problems, and because 
the appointments themselves take time. Mosher notes that during 
I 
I both the Carter and Reagan transitions, the Senate confirmation 
process was time-consuming. He explains: 
I
 
I
 
The 
Confirmation of more than half of their appointments in 
the State Department took longer than two months, and 
in the Defense Department, about one month. But some 
cases required three months or more, some were delayed 
by a half year, and a few were held up by an individual 
senator indefinitely (1987:120). 
lack of political advisors in key positions makes it 
I difficult for a new leader to assess and formulate policy, 
leading to a delay in arms control negotiations or a hastily and 
I 
I poorly-constructed policy. These complications seem to indicate 
that regardless of a president's commitment to arms control, 
transition time will impede progress in arms control. 
I Presidential commitment to arms control. A willingness on 
I 9 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
the part of the president is necessary to negotiate any arms 
control agreement. Miller claims: " ... the strong and direct 
commitment of the President and his close associates in the White 
House seems to be a decisive element in determining whether and 
how much arms control can succeed" (1984:89). Because the 
president is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, 
s/he must be willing to incorporate the concept of arms control 
in order to mobilize the bureaucracy around the task of 
negotiating a suitable agreement. Without a strong presidential 
commitment to and involvement in arms control, bureaucratic 
efforts may lack cohesion and direction (Seaborg and Loeb 
1987:449). Different components of the bureaucracy may be 
motivated by conflicting purposes and goals, and a personal 
interest by the president is necessary to mold these into a 
single national policy. 
Miller claims that although presidential commitment to arms 
control is a necessary factor to the ratification of a treaty, by 
itself it is not sufficient (1984:90). There are many political 
impediments that cannot be overcome by presidential will alone, 
as the Carter administration demonstrated. Additionally, it is 
difficult to evaluate the sincerity of the presidential 
commitment itself. A president may enter arms control 
negotiations to placate political opposition without any real 
commitment to a treaty, as Reagan was often accused of doing 
(Diehl 1987:9). Or, a president may offer a far-reaching 
proposal simply to embarrass a rival, with no intent to reach an 
10 
I 
I agreement (Diehl 1987:9). Therefore, although presidential 
commitment to arms control may be necessary to successfully 
I negotiate a treaty; it may be difficult to ascertain the 
I sincerity of this commitment. Often a perceived commitment may 
I 
simply be a political ploy to achieve an end other than the 
reduction of arms. In this type of case, no treaty is intended, 
and the political climate for future arms control may be 
I jeopardized. 
The Department of state and the National Security Council 
I 
I Two key government actors influencing arms control policy 
are the National Security staff and the Department of State. 
Although these two components of the bureaucracy are separate 
I entities, and will be evaluated individually at the beginning of 
this section, they have overlapping functions as well. In this 
I 
I respect, it is appropriate to define one component in terms of 
how it affects the other, as well as what happens when conflict 
ensues between the two. 
I The department of state. Unlike the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, a quasi-independent member of the Department 
I 
I of State, the state Department proper lacks expertise in the 
technical aspects of bilateral arms control (Clarke 1979:123). 
This affects State's ability to be a major voice in the analysis 
I of arms control policy. Additionally, State Department employees 
find themselves with little time to concentrate on arms control 
I matters. As Gelb explains: 
I Precisely because the secretary and the departments are engaged in and have primary responsibility for the 
I 11 
I 
I 
I conduct of foreign policy, i.e., the day-to-day business of diplomacy and congressional appearances, as 
a practical matter there is little time to make policy. 
I It seems inconceivable that such day-to-day tasks 
I 
should even take precedence over policymaking, but they 
do; there is no choice. By and large, this is true of 
the state Department's policy planning staff as well 
(1983:287). 
Clarke concurs with this analysis, noting that the Secretary of 
I 
I state "must deal daily with many diverse issues; he could not and 
should not focus too heavily on arms control" (1979:114). An 
example of what can happen if a Secretary of State attempts to be 
I involved in all areas of foreign policy concern can be seen in 
Henry Kissinger. In addition to running the activities of the 
I 
I state Department and engaging in Middle East diplomacy, Kissinger 
was also involved in SALT II negotiations. As a result, he may 
have been a contributing factor to the slow progress made in the 
I negotiations while he was Secretary of State (Jenson 1988:49). 
The State Department's influence is also curtailed by the 
I president himself. Gelb explains that one reason presidents 
prefer their own national security staff is because the StateI 
I 
Department does not attempt to frame its proposals in a manner in 
which will elicit political support. Because State is not 
attuned to politics, Gelb claims, they are "doomed to being 
I ignored" (1983:284). Additionally, presidents eventually notice 
that the primary interest of the State Department is the long 
I 
I term, whereas an individual president is more apt to stress the 
short term as circumscribed by his or her own term in office. 
Although presidents may begin their term by utilizing visible 
I actors such as the State Department, they soon turn to members 
I 12 
I 
I 
I in their own staff with more accomodating political views in 
order to articulate their policy interests (Gelb 1983:285). 
I National security assistant and staff. The original role of 
the national security advisor was the coordination of defense,I foreign policy, and other security matters, as well as to 
I identify matters that required presidential attention (Fox 
1982:52). This role, however, has been expanding in recent 
I times. As Destler notes: 
For each of the five presidents of the sixties andI seventies, the primary manager of foreign policy issues 
I 
I 
was the assistant for national security affairs. Under 
the formal aegis of the National Security Council, this 
aide has headed a staff of foreign policy analysts and 
operators which has varied in size--no more than 12 
under McGeorge Bundy (1961-66), rising to 18 under Walt 
Rostow (1966-69) and to a peak of over 50 under Henry 
Kissinger (1969-1975) before dropping into the 40s 
under Brent Scowcroft (1975-77) and the 30s under 
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977-81) (1983:261).I other authors on foreign policy decision-making agree that 
I although the stature of the NSC may have fluctuated under 
different presidents and advisors, it has become a much more 
I important force in po1icymaking than it was in the 1960s (Gelb 
1983; Mosher et.al. 1987).I Many authors have noticed that the NSC has often been used 
as an alternative to the State Department (Ge1b 1983; Dest1erI 
1983; 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Mosher et.al. 1987). Destler claims: 
The "National Security Council" became in practice not 
the powerful senior advisory forum envisioned at its 
creation, but the senior aide and staff instituted 
under the Council name. Presidents employed this aide 
and staff not just as a link to the permanent 
government but 
for certain is
(1983:260). 
also 
sues 
as 
they 
an alternative 
deemed particularly 
to it, at 
imp
least 
ortant 
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I 
I A historical example of the substitution of the national security 
apparatus for the traditional role of the state Department can be 
I seen in the conduct of President Nixon's arms control policy. 
Nixon was of the firm opinion that the direction of foreign 
I 
I policy should originate in the White House and be transmitted to 
the bureaucracy (Sonnenfeldt 1967:67), and in accordance with 
this belief, negotiations at the 1972 Moscow summit were carried 
I out by National Security Assistant Kissinger at the exclusion of 
the state Department (McDonald 1967:63). 
I 
I There are several reasons that presidents gravitate toward 
their national security staff. One reason is that presidents 
feel a need to search for opportunities to visibly demonstrate 
I their capacity for leadership, and this is not possible if 
important foreign policy decisions are made by the bureaucracy. 
I 
I So, eventually, the role of the State Department is lessened to 
make the president look competent and active (Gelb 1963:266). 
Another reason presidents place such important on the NSC 
I staff is because they see these individuals as more attuned to 
their own personal needs (Destler 1963; Gelb 1963). As Destler 
I explains: 
I Staff-dominated policymaking provides the president a responsive personal environment (his senior experts, just down the hall, a minute's walk away) while 
reducing the degree he works personally with seniorI statutory aides who have competing institutional 
I 
loyalties--the secretaries of state and defense, the 
joint chiefs of staff--and thus shielding him somewhat 
from the political-institutional realities of the world 
I 
outside 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue (1963:272). 
Because the president expects those aides who are in close 
I 14 
I 
I 
I physical proximity to his office to be better informed about his 
own personal interests than the institutional bureaucracy at 
I Foggy Bottom, the NSC staff is the most logical recipient of his 
or her trust. As Gelb notes, regardless of the formal powerI 
I 
structure in the system, actual power will be vested in those 
whose political views parallel those of the president (1983:291). 
It has been observed that officials formerly employed in the 
I state Department, Defense Department, and the CIA tend to act 
differently when they are a member of the White House staff 
I 
I simply because they are physicially closer to the president and 
know what issues and policies concern White House officials (Gelb 
1983:284). 
I A president may also place more trust in his/her NSC staff 
because of the nature of the position itself. A member of the 
I 
I NSC staff is appointed by the president, and is not subject to 
approval by Congress. Because the staffer answers only to the 
president, and has been selected primarily because the president 
I has respect for his/her abilities, the president is more likely 
to feel comfortable consulting the NSC staff member. 
I 
I Additionally, because the NSC staff are not entrenched in 
the bureaucracy, the president often views them as being more 
flexible components in the decision-making process (Destler 
I 1983:263), and thus may be more likely to seek options from them 
on important arms control issues. 
I 
I Another crucial function performed by the NSC is that of 
intermediary between the president and the Pentagon. Because the 
I 15 
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I 
I Pentagon will not cooperate with the state Department on arms 
control matters, the NSC staff must be the interagency 
I communications link (Gelb 1983:286). This gives the NSC the 
unique role of coordinator and synthesizer of bureaucratic inputsI 
I 
in the arms control policymaking process. 
National security-department of state conflict. As has been 
described above, there are overlapping functions between the 
I state Department and the NSC. As Gelb notes, "While the 
secretary of state, as head of the senior agency with expertise 
I 
I would be the logical foreign policy leader, it is 'natural' for 
reasons of propinquity and politics for the NSC advisor to play 
such a role as well" (1983:295). The NSC actively seeks to usurp 
I the role of the state Department as well. Gelb claims: 
... national security advisors and their staffs haveI tended above all to focus on and political-strategic 
considerably less attention 
I economic questions. This too inclinations, but it also 
state Department business 
relationships--paying 
to defense and foreign 
may reflect presidential 
means that the staff 
coordinates less, and competes more with state and its 
secretary (1983:273).I 
I 
Often the NSC actually serves as a replacement for the state 
Department in the policymaking process. This, of course, is 
likely to lead to conflict between the two actors. As has 
I already been indicated, the NSC has had the primary policymaking 
function in most administrations since the late 1960s. 
I 
I Similarly, there has been conflict among the NSC assistant and 
other members of the bureaucracy in every administration. One of 
the most memorable conflicts appeared during the Carter 
I administration between Secretary of State Vance and National 
I 16 
I 
I 
I Security Assistant Brzezinski. These two advisers had very 
different perspectives on international affairs, and different 
I goals for arms control policy. Carter attempted to accomodate 
the competing advise of both individuals, but often wound upI 
I 
favoring one over the other, often not in a consistent pattern. 
This did nothing for the credibility of his policies. Such 
conflicts also occurred in the succeeding Reagan administration. 
I The Office of Research Coodination of the CRS' notes that because 
of serious interagency conflicts and the ensuing confusion of 
I 
I purpose and tactics, the Reagan administration gave the 
impression that it did not want to negotiate seriously 
(1988:235). 
I Although there are unique problems and advantages in relying 
solely on the State Department or the NSC, there are also 
I 
I difficulties when no attempts are made to forge a cooperative 
decison-making apparatus. Diehl notes that when bureaucratic 
components cooperate in policymaking, they can be a positive 
I force. But, when there is conflict and dispute between agencies, 
"the prospects for arms control is considerably dimmed" 
I 
I (1987:12). Additionally, bureaucratic conflict, particularly 
when a president relies on the NSC staff, harms the consensus­
building mechanisms necessary for the implementation of the arms 
I control agreements that are negotiated. 
The Arms Control and pisarmament Agency
I The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be considered, 
I 'Congressional Research Service 
I 17 
I 
I 
I for the purposes of this paper, to be an independent factor 
influencing arms control. This is justified due to the Agency's 
I semi-independent status within the state Department. The 1961 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act made the director of the AgencyI 
I 
"the principal advisor to the Secretary of State and the 
President on arms control and disarmament matters" (Clarke 
1985:198). However, this status fails to grant the Agency 
I complete autonomy. Clarke notes that although the Agency 
director has the legal authority to report directly to the 
I 
I president, s/he remains under the direction of the Secretary of 
State, making the Agency quasi-independent at best (1985:198). 
Additionally, Clarke explains that the Agency is in no way a 
I mechanical puppet of the State Department. Instead, there is a 
concerted effort by both parties to coordinate their positions on 
I 
I arms control, contributing to the Agency's "quasi-independence" 
(1979:111). Because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has 
functions which are both distinct and to some degree separate 
I from the duties of the State Department, its effects on arms 
control will be evaluated as a factor in itself. 
I 
I As a member of a large government bureaucracy, the ACDA is 
affected by the actions of other components of the system. 
Senator Cranston notes that policymaking is a function of the 
I executive branch, and although the ACDA has some responsibility 
within this branch for formulating arms control policy, it is 
I only one of the elements in the process (1978:205). The 
I president primarily uses senior advisors during important 
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I consultations. The junior status of the ACDA, in addition to the 
image problems of the Agency which will be discussed later, 
I preclude it from being utilized in these crucial decisions 
(Clarke 1985:204). 
I 
I Within the office of the president, the ADCA is dependent 
upon the structure of the National Security Council for its power 
to influence arms control policy. This includes placement on 
I various committees, the amount of interagency cooperation, and 
the president's willingness to conduct arms control negotiations 
I 
I (Clarke 1985:217). Although formally the ACDA director has 
advisory status in the NSC, this role may be enhanced or limited 
by the manner in which the system operates under a particular 
I president. Clarke compares the disorganized and confusing 
national security structure at the onset of the Reagan 
I 
I Administration (1985:212) to the well-organized, coordinated 
systems of the Ford and Nixon administrations (1985:217), and 
concludes that there is a relationship between the clarity of 
I organization in the national security council (or lack of) and 
the ACDA's ability to contribute to policy formulation (or 
I 
I inability). The influence of the ACDA upon the NSC appears to 
depend upon the structure of the NSC system itself more than its 
legally designated role.
 
I Often the NSC structure itself is abandoned in presidential
 
I 
decision-making. Final decisions are often made informally by
I top-level advisors without any direct influence from the ACDA 
(Clarke 1985:214). The ACDA has no institutional mechanism for 
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I 
I contributing to this type of informal decision. The president is 
not mandated to solicit the advice of the director. Because the 
I Agency has no real public or congressional constituency, it has 
no bargaining lever to use to gain influence in the decision­
I 
I making apparatus. As a result, Clarke claims that "on major, 
politically sensitive transactions--even in the Carter 
administration (thought to be the most receptive to the advice of 
I the ACDA)--ACDA's input is usually not considered, at least not 
on a timely basis" (1985:215). 
I 
I The president may also effect the role of the ACDA in 
his/her appointment of directors. For example, President Reagan 
appointed two directors during his two terms--Eugene Rostow and 
I Kenneth Adelman. Clarke classifies them both as "members of the 
conservative, global containment, 'rearmament,' anti-SALT group 
I 
I that directed American national security policy during this 
period" (1985:211). The director is the mouthpiece for the 
Agency. When s/he is hostile to arms control, or lacks 
I experience (as Rostow did), arms control concerns are less likely 
to be articulated effectively by the Agency. This diminishes the 
I 
I ACDA's ability to influence policy. On occasion, the ACDA lacks 
a director. When Reagan first took office, the ACDA had to wait 
for six months before it obtained a director confirmed by the 
I Senate (Clarke 1985:211). Later, when Rostow was fired, it took 
another four months before ACDA had a director (Clarke 1985:212).
I As of the end of April, President Bush has not yet appointed a 
I director for the ACDA. This lack of a credible Agency mouthpiece 
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I 
I may decrease its likelihood of being consulted on important arms 
control decisions.
 
I Another actor affecting the influence of the ACDA on arms
 
control is the state Department. Jenson notes that the role of 
I 
I the ACDA is circumscribed by the state Department, to which the 
ACDA is subservient. This limits the ACDA's ability to formulate 
arms control policy (1988:26). Additionally, within that 
I relationship, ACDA is directed to "manage" negotiations, and the 
Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament 
I 
I Negotiations reports to the director, who must consult with the 
secretary of state before the president is advised of the 
progress of negotiations (Clarke 1985:202). 
I The ACDA director does have the legal authority to 
circumvent the State Department apparatus and confide in the 
I 
I president directly (Clarke 1979:109). For this mechanism to be 
effective, a cordial relationship must exist between the 
president and the director. According to Clarke, the only 
I director in the history of the ACDA to have such a relationship 
with a president was Warnke. This resulted in increased access 
I 
I to the Oval Office and a positive reception with President Carter 
(1985:204). However, Clarke also notes that Warnke had a close 
personal relationship with Secretary of State Vance (1985:204). 
I Clarke declines to comment on how the relationship between Warnke 
and Vance may have facilitated cordiality between Warnke and 
I 
I Carter, but it is possible that Warnke may not have been as 
effective had Vance's friendship been absent. 
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I 
I Even given a personal friendship between a president and an 
ACDA director, direct consultation is infrequent. Clarke claims 
I that, in fact, such direct consultation has yet to occur. He 
argues, "No ACDA director, to my knowledge, has ever seen theI 
I 
president about ongoing negotiations--or any other matter-­
without first consulting the secretary" (1985:202). The 
secretary of state is, then, the sieve through which ACDA arms 
I control policies must be filtered before they reach the ear of 
the president, who is the final executor of all foreign policy. 
I 
I The ACDA is restricted by the degree of automony that the 
secretary of state chooses to allow it. For instance, Kissinger 
kept the role of the ACDA strictly supervised, limiting its 
I potential for independent action, while Rogers allowed ACDA a 
high degree of autonomy in dealing with arms control matters 
I 
I (Clarke 1979:109).2 Clarke notes that tightening the rein of 
control over the ACDA "risks stifling the distinctive voice ACDA 
must have to carry out its mission" (1985:199). 
I Because the state Department may utilize information on arms 
control provided by the ACDA, and because ACDA depends on the 
I 
I state Department to channel its findings to the President, both 
actors benefit from cooperating with each other. If the 
relationship between the ACDA director and the Secretary of State 
I is negative, the opportunities for cooperation and coordination 
I 2Clarke Rogers was notes that one the fact that reason Rogers for the himself 
secretary of state. This contributed to the 
I ACDA in this period. 
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I 
autonomy allowed by 
was not a strong 
independence of the 
I 
I are jeopardized (Clarke 1979:109). However, despite its 
complaints about being excluded from certain executive policy 
I discussions, ACDA and the state Department generally operate in a 
cooperative atmosphere in most arms control negotiations (ClarkeI 
I 
1985:202). This is the optimal relationship for both actors, 
with the ACDA providing the state Department with analytical 
research in exchange for a chance to participate in the 
I formulation of arms control policy. 
In addition to relations with the secretary of state, the 
I 
I ACDA may be affected by its relations with other actors in the 
executive branch as well. For instance, during the Nixon 
administration ACDA director Gerard Smith, who is remembered for 
I some of the most productive periods in the history of the ACDA, 
"eventually resigned over strained relations with Assistant for 
I 
I National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger" (Clarke 1985:210). 
This indicates that although a positive relationship with the 
secretary of state is a necessary prerequisite for an opportunity 
I to play a role in arms control policy-making, it is not 
sufficient to guarantee that role. Additional actors may present 
I 
I obstacles to ACDA's success. In the Reagan administration's 
National Security Council of 1982, Richard Burt of the State 
Department and Richard Perle of the Defense Department were 
I primarily responsible for coordinating the NSC system. Both were 
critical of arms control and did not provide ACDA with an 
I 
I opportunity to be an influence on U.S. foreign policy (Clarke 
1985:217). The ACDA is not able to circumvent the authority of 
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I 
I these other actors because it does not have an outside 
constituency to lobby on its behalf. Clarke claims that such a 
I constituency "can importantly buttress an agency's clout within 
the executive branch" (1985:225). The agency's lack of pressureI 
I 
groups renders it incapable of countering opposition to arms 
control within the executive branch. It must depend upon 
receptive members of the departments it deals with in order to 
I contribute to arms control. 
Despite the limitations on ACDA's ability to be a direct 
I 
I participant in the formulation of policy, the agency is able to 
indirectly influence arms control by the information that it 
provides to policymaking groups. The basic role of ACDA appears 
I to be an provider of analytical data. Clarke claims that the 
analytical capability of the ACDA has led to professionalism in 
I 
I arms control and has allowed it to contribute decisively to 
several arms control agreements (1985:198). Clarke also 
identifies testimony from an ACDA scientist, who claims that the 
I conceptual origin for all arms control initiatives is the ACDA, 
adding that during the Nixon-Ford era of SALT negotiations, ACDA 
I 
I did between 50- and 90 percent of the analysis and paper-writing 
for the endeavor (1979:115). 
Additionally, its research capability allows it to act as a 
I catalyst in the introduction of new ideas and to keep those ideas 
active in the system (Clarke 1985:203). Because the Agency is a 
I 
I permanent institution which concentrates on one specific aspect 
of foreign policy--arms control--it brings an element of 
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I 
I continuity to arms control negotiations (Clarke 1979:115). In 
I 
this respect, ACDA can be seen as the perpetual nagging voice in 
I the bureaucracy demanding that policymakers consider arms control 
options. The Agency is effective to the extent that the 
I 
executive branch listens to and acts upon its advice. 
Clarke claims that the in-house defense expertise of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency exerts some influence on the 
I formulation of arms control policy for the Agency. He explains: 
"It combines technical, scientific, economic, and foreign affairs 
I 
I specialists with one of the largest defense systems analysis 
operations outside the Pentagon. This capability affords ACDA a 
measure of independence vis-a-vis state and Defense and, to the 
I extent that it is used by policymakers, a degree of influence" 
(1979:122). The research conducted by ACDA is beneficial to 
I 
I policymakers because it provides them with an objective basis for 
decision-making. Clarke argues that without the analytical 
support of the ACDA, there "would not be an effective analytical 
I counterweight to DOD" (1979:125). This prevents the government's 
approach to arms control from being motivated solely by military 
I 
I concerns. ACDA provides options and alternate viewpoints, which 
are crucial to informed decision-making. Clarke goes on to claim 
that: "An administration intent on gutting the agency will surely 
I undercut this capability because, absent a sound analytical base, 
ACDA is effectively disarmed; it then has little of value to 
I 
I offer other governmental units" (1965:222). 
ACDA's research also benefits members of Congress who are 
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I 
briefed by the Agency regarding the progress of on-going 
negotiations. ACDA keeps Congress informed through committee 
hearings, briefings, consultations, and meetings with individual 
Senators and Congressmen and their staff (ACDA Annual Report 
1984:111). This is done through the Office of General Counsel 
and Congressional Affairs. Additionally, the Agency director 
claimed to have visited Congress more than 25 times in 1984 (ACDA 
Annual Report 1984:111). Clarke indicates, "Without ACDA, the 
quantity and quality of arms control information received by 
Congress as well as the essential and valuable oversight role of 
congressional authorizing committees would be sharply reduced" 
(1985:203). The Agency claims that the communication channel 
flows both ways--they provide information to Congress and 
Congress makes recommendations to ACDA about its own arms control 
goals. 
Because the agency must receive information from other 
components of the bureaucracy in order to synthesize and analyze 
arms control concerns, it depends on cooperation from those 
actors for its own influence. Clarke claims that on balance, 
during bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, "ACDA's 
access to information directly affecting these negotiations is 
generally adequate" (1979:104). Specifically, he notes that the 
cooperation of the CIA has been consistent, particularly because 
during most of the Agency's first 17 years, at least one of the 
Agency's high-ranking officers was a former CIA official 
(1979:106). The ACDA is also able to get information from the 
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I 
I- NSC if difficulties occur. Clarke claims that throughout the 
1970s, the NSC staff was cooperative in supplying the ACDA with 
I 
t all but the most sensitive information (1979:105). 
Not all bureacuratic actors, however, are as receptive to 
ACDA's requests for information. Because the ACDA is small in 
I size and has the status of a junior actor within the executive 
branch, it relies on the good will of senior actors for much of 
I its informational resources. Clarke notes, "Information is the 
grist of the policy process and can be utilized to influence 
I 
I outcomes. Problems arise and hard bargaining frequently results 
when a department withholds, partially withholds, or delays 
submission of information deemed vital by another bureaucratic 
I actor" (1979:100). The ACDA's influence on arms control policy, 
I then, may be limited by uncooperative parties within the 
I 
executive branch. One of these limiting factors is the 
Department of Defense. The ACDA formally has a Senior Military 
•Advisor who acts as a liason between its offices and the office 
t of the Secretary of Defense. Despite this, ACDA is seldom given 
information about the DOD's future defense plans, which is a 
t 
I necessary factor in fomulating current and future arms control 
approaches. Clarke relates an example of an ACDA analyst who was 
shocked to find that the ACDA did not have a copy of the 000'5 
I Five-Year Defense Plan. Apparently before working for ACDA this 
analyst had had regular access to the document. Secretary of 
I Defense Laird denied Gerard Smith's request for a copy of the 
i report, and the analyst, working through a network of personal 
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I 
I contacts, had to go to the Pentagon to view it. He was not 
I 
permitted to take a copy from the building (1979:103). The DOD 
I also excludes ACDA from input on planning for future weapons 
systems, although this may directly affect ACDA's job in the 
bureaucracy. Although Congress attempted to remedy this problem 
t by requiring the ACDA to prepare annual Arms Control Impact 
statements, the DOD and the ACDA both agree that the statements 
I 
, "have virtually no impact on weapons· decisions, strain 
interdepartmental relations, and are burdensome, time-consuming, 
I 
and costly" (Clarke 1985:216). The DOD, then, has the ability to 
limit the influence of the ACDA by denying it critical 
, 
information for assessing arms control proposals. It appears 
I 
that the DOD often utilizes this ability. 
Another informational problem ACDA faces is backchannel 
I 
negotiations. This occurs when the national security advisor or 
the secretary of state chooses to conduct negotiations in secret, 
without informing ACDA of the results. Clarke claims that in 
t many of the important breakthroughs in sensitive strategic arms 
negotiations, the executive exercises his prerogative by 
I 
I conducting the talks on an informal level, without the 
participation of ACDA (1985:206). Goldberger distinguishes 
between "technical" and "policy" information, noting that 
I although ACDA usually has access to technical information during 
on-going negotiations, it may be kept in the dark about policy
I decisions and developments (1988:104). Backchanne1 negotiations 
I
, 
were particularly prevalent during Kissenger's reign as National 
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I 
I Security Advisor to President Nixon. According to Clarke, Gerard 
I 
Smith was constantly uninformed of the private meetings between 
I Kissenger and the Soviets which were conducted parallel to the 
formal negotiations that Smith himself was conducting. Often 
breakthroughs in SALT happened of which Smith was unaware, 
t although his Soviet counterparts across the bargaining table were 
(1979:105). This certainly diminished Smith's credibility, and 
I severely restricted the Agency's influence on the arms control 
I process. 
I 
The Agency does, however, often playa more significant role 
in frontchannel negotiations. The role of the ACDA in these 
negotiations is "managment" of the talks on a policy course 
I "directed" by the president and his/her advisors (Clarke 
I 1985:205). The chief negotiator of the Strategic Arms Limitation 
f 
Talks/Strategic Arms Reduction Talks is generally an employee of 
ACDA, and through the Agency's director, reports the progress of 
the talks to the secretary of state and the president (Clarke 
f 1985:205). Although it is possible for a president to choose a 
separate chief negotiator, the Agency is still always represented 
f 
I in the delegation, and it chairs the SALT /START backstopping 
committee, thus ensuring the Agency a role in the implementation 
of policy (Slocombe and Kramer 1985:118). In 1977, Congress 
I created the position of Special Representative for Arms Control 
and Disarmament Negotiations, ranking equally with Deputy
I Director, to allow a substitute chair of the delegation when the 
f Agency director's duties mandate that s/he remain in Washington 
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I 
I (Slocombe and Kramer 1985:119). The Ambassador to the INF talks 
was housed in ACDA as well. The responsibilities of the leader 
I of an arms control delegation include preparing positions for the 
I negotiations (under guidelines established by the president), the 
I 
actual leading of the delegation, and briefing the President, 
Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Council 
Advisor, NATO, Congress, and other officials (ACDA Annual Report 
I 1984:121). The formal role of ACDA, then, gives the Agency an 
, opportunity to influence arms control when the Director or 
I 
Special Representative actually chairs the delegation. Slocombe 
and Kramer claim, "In practice, ACDA's role in most formal 
negotiations is substantial" (1985:111). 
, 
, There are other ways in which ACDA influences arms control 
negotiations. The Agency's Bureau of Strategic Programs is 
I 
responsible for developing recommendations for arms control 
strategy and tactics, as well as language for current and future 
bilateral arms reduction talks (ACDA Annual Report 1984:124). 
I Additionally, ACDA provides legal advisors to negotiating 
I 
delegations through its Office of General Counsel and 
I congressional Affairs (ACDA Annual Report 1984:126). The 
administrative personnel for negotiating delegations is provided 
t 
by the Agency's Bureau of Strategic Programs, which is also 
responsible for periodic ABH Treaty Reviews, the Standing 
Consultation Committee, and diplomatic advisory personnel in on­
I going negotiations (ACDA Annual Report 1984:124). This bureau 
I also bears the primary responsibility for consulting with allies, 
I 
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I 
I 
I preparing analyses of military systems and integrating them into 
I 
the planning process, and monitoring external research contracts 
I on outer space weapons systems, and strategic and theater forces 
(ACDA Annual Report 1984:124). The Bureau of Verification and 
Intelligence plans, organizes, and supervises studies on the 
, verifiability of current and proposed treaties (ACDA Annual 
Report 1984:125) and works on the development of improved means 
I for verification (ACDA Annual Report 1984:10). The Agency also 
participates in interagency working level groups made up of 
I 
I junior and senior actors which attempt to coordinate positions on 
ongoing and prospective negotiations (Clarke 1985:214). In 
, 
addition to chairing negotiating delegations, then, ACDA has a 
broad range of responsibilities in areas which supplement the 
arms control process.t 
I 
ACDA's influence in these areas is often affected by its 
image. According to Clarke, many in the DOD and the military, as 
well as congressional conservatives, pejoratively refer to ACDA 
I officials as "arms controllers," and imply that they are "soft" 
on national security (1985:207). ACDA does not have the 
t 
I constituency to give the Agency the bureaucratic leverage it 
needs in order to counter these charges. often, the suspicion 
aroused by the military or certain conservatives in Congress 
I serves to limit the formal role of ACDA. John Newhouse claims 
that the distrust that Kissinger and others in the executive 
I 
I branch had of Gerard Smith had an effect on the confidence given 
to the formal negotiations headed by Smith (Clarke 1979:35). 
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This distrust may have contributed to Kissinger's extensive use 
of backchannel negotiations in order to limit the role of ACDA 
officials. Suspicion of ACDA had done more than simply limit the 
Agency's negotiating power; twice it has resulted in "purges" 
which have severely damaged the very operation of the agency 
itself. 
The first purge took place in 1974. According to Clarke, 
the circumstances following the purge had their roots in 
congressional disappointment in the first SALT treaty. He claims 
that there was skepticism about the likelihood of a SALT II 
agreement, some former supporters of SALT I felt that perhaps the 
treaty was simply a cover-up for "escalating armament levels," 
and doubts about the effectiveness of the Agency led to a 
congressional investigation (1979:33). Jenson claims that the 
investigation took place at the instigation of Senator Jackson 
(1988:38), who was so disappointed by SALT I that he proposed the 
Jackson Amendment (a statement by Congress which specified equal 
limits on weapons for a future SALT II treaty). During this 
purge, fourteen high-level ACDA officials were fired as were 
about one-third of the Agency's personnel (Jenson 1988:51). The 
budget was also cut sharply. This purge limited ACDA's capacity 
to conduct research and to participate in policy formulation. 
Although ACDA eventually recovered from this purge, it was not to 
be the only occurrance. 
The 1981 purge, provoked largely by Senator Jesse Helms, was 
more devastating than the first (Clarke 1985:210). Not only was 
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I 
I the Agency's budget drastically reduced, but it also suffered a 
I 
severe depletion in personnel. This personnel shortage "made it 
I hard or impossible to adequately staff and support ongoing 
negotiations while simultaneously carrying out essential 
I 
analytical and interagency functions" (Clarke 1985:206). Clarke 
claims that the morale of the Agency was low, and poor internal 
management limited its policy role. He cites a General 
I Accounting Office Report which found that between March of 1981 
and September of 1982, there were eight organizational 
I
 
I redesignations, some of which reversed changes made only a short
 
while before (1985:211). Some of the effects of the purge on the
 
Agency were even more severe.
 
I Some of the results of the massive budget cuts were listed
 
I
 by Clarke:
 
--The Agency's research budget sank to an all-time low 
of 1 million 
I --The elimination of many staff positions 
I --The Agency's library was moved to the George Washington University (where it could not be recovered for at least five years)
 
I --The Office of Operations Analysis (and computer
 
I
 
system) was abolished (1985, p222).
 
It has been noted that the ACOA's ability to provide information
 
was its chief bargaining lever in the policymaking process. With
 
I the diminishing of this ability, ACOA's influence has also been
 
severely diminished.
 
I
 
I The question of ACOA's future is still up in the air. In
 
1983, congressional concern over the Agency led it to appropriate
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• 
21 million for the fiscal year 1984, and under pressure in 
August of that year, the Reagan administration vowed to request 
I 
I an additional 2 million for that fiscal year (Clarke 1985:225). 
Additionally, the Reagan administration indicated that it planned 
to phase in 25 more employees over a two-year period (Clarke
, 1985:225). However, the effects of the changes may not be 
substantial--the computer facilities alone will cost much more 
I than the original 5 million investment (Clarke 1985:224), and 
restoration of employees and morale will be slow. It is also not 
I 
I clear how future administrations will choose to utilize ACDA. 
The influence of ACDA is dependent on the attitudes of others 
concerning arms control, defense expenditures, the nature of the 
I Soviet Union, and the proper role of the United States in world 
I politics (Clarke 1985:198). Clarke suggests that the ACDA will 
t 
always be influential up to a certain point, but beyond strictly 
controlled limits, it would be politically unwise for an 
administration to become too visibly committed to arms control 
I (1985:198). 
Congress 
I 
I Congressional committees. Congressional committees are the 
foundation for the congressional decision-making process. 
Although a wide range of committees may have a peripheral 
I interest in arms control, the issue is formally in the domain of 
I 
four committees: the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate 
I Foreign Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees. Because the two houses of Congress are 
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I 
I constitutionally authorized to perform different tasks, the 
I 
manner in which they influence arms control also differs. The 
I Senate is empowered with the responsibility of "advice and 
consent" on treaties, as well as approval of presidential 
appointments. The House is responsible for approving government 
I expenditures. 
Although evaluation of arms control treaties are within the 
I jurisdiction of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it plays a 
small role in this process. First, the House Foreign Affairs 
I 
I Committee does not have the political clout of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, perhaps, in part, because members of the 
House committee cannot vote for the formal ratification of a 
I treaty. Second, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is classified 
I as a "minor committee," which means that its members may serve on 
I 
other committees as well. This may minimize the amount of time 
committee members are willing to devote to any issue that they 
are not obligated to evaluate. Third, according to Spanier and 
I Uslaner, constituents of congresspersons are not as concerned 
with foreign policy as they are with domestic issues. Elections 
I by district every two years forces congresspersons to be 
, responsive to these concerns. Because a visible profile in the 
foreign ·policy arena may lead to accusations of being more 
interested in the fate of other nations than the people of one's
­ own district, a congressperson is likely to avoid becoming 
I 
I involved in these areas (Spanier and Uslaner 1989:167-169). The 
main activity of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is foreign 
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I 
I aid legislation, which, Spanier and Uslaner note, is not a 
I 
salient issue for the mass public (1989:185). It does not appear 
I that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has any significant 
influence on arms control due to the lack of a formal mechanism 
I 
to promote influence, and a lack of desire to become involved in 
foreign policy issues. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in comparison, has a 
I much more active role in formulating arms control policy. The 
committee has jurisdiction over a wide range of issues, including 
I 
I general arms control and disarmament matters, arms sales, 
treaties, executive agreements, military and economic assistance 
programs, and overseeing the activities of the Department of 
I State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Clark 
I 1978:100). Additionally, the Foreign Relations Committee has a 
t 
charter to "study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters 
relating to the national security policy of the United 
States" (Clark 1978:100). On occasion, the Foreign Relations 
I Committee may invite members of other committees to participate 
in hearings related to treaties, it is not obligated to do so. 
I 
I In the case of SALT II, the Senate Armed Services Committee held 
hearings on the military implications of the treaty, but Senate 
I 
Majority Leader Byrd did not permit their opposition report to be 
filed until a year later (Congressional Research Service report 
I 
1984:106). The Foreign Relations Committee also holds 
I confirmation hearings on several presidential appointments, 
including State Department and ACDA officials, as well as the 
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heads of negotiating delegations. The committee, it appears, has 
the formal authority to influence arms control in a significant 
manner. However, this authority is dependent upon the degree to 
which the committee is willing to exercise it, as well as the 
amount of cooperation offered by the executive. 
The House and Senate Armed Service Committees are primarily 
concerned with military affairs, the defense budget, and arms 
exports (Spanier and Us1aner 1989:183-4). They have a reputation 
for following the advice of military leaders on issues related to 
military strategy and arms control (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452), 
and those who gravitate toward these committees tend to be 
classified as conservatives who are supportive of increases in 
military spending (Aspin 1978:46; Spanier and Us1aner 1989:188). 
The reason for this pro-military attitude may be that those 
members of Congress with military bases or defense industries in 
their state or district seek out assignment to these committees 
(Aspin 1978:46; Spanier and Us1aner 1989:188). The role of the 
Senate and House Armed Services Committee on the negotiation of 
arms control treaties seems to be peripheral: they have no 
formal jurisdiction to hold hearings on treaty ratification, and 
they appear to be highly influenced by the Pentagon and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on their decision to support (or refusua1 to 
support) a given treaty. Therefore, they are not viewed, for the 
purpose of this paper, to be an important independent factor in 
infuencing arms control. 
Congressional mechanisms to influence arms control. In 
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I 
I addition to the activities of individual committees, Congress 
also has a role, as an entity, in the arms control process. This 
I is particularly true of the Senate, as this chamber is 
responsible for voting for or against treaty ratification. 
I 
I Acting as a body, Congress has several mechanisms by which to 
influence arms control. 
First, the Senate has several constitutional mechanisms 
I through which they can affect an arms control treaty. These 
mechanisms revolve around the Senate's responsibility for treaty 
I 
I ratification. Initially, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction over treaties, may hold 
extensive hearings involving a large number of witnesses. 
I However, the influence of the Senate at this point is limited due 
to indirect control of the process by the executive branch. 
I 
I Although the decision to conduct a hearing is made by the 
Committee Chairman in consultation with the Ranking Minority 
Member, the decision is made on the basis of a report written by 
I the State Department which ranks treaty priorities (congressional 
I 
Research Service study 1984:107). Although a Committee is not 
I obligated to adhere to these priorities, the State Department's 
rankings are usually respected. Additionally, the hearings 
I 
themselves typically involve witnesses from the State Department, 
which is a component of the executive branch (Congressional 
Research Service study 1984:108). In this respect, treaty 
I hearings by their very nature serve to limit the power of 
senators for autonomous actions to influence arms controlI 
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I 
I treaties. 
The decision to ratify a treaty, however, may be based on 
I more than simply executive testimony. outside sources of 
information, in addition to personal opinion, may convinceI members of the Senate that ratification of the treaty as is would 
I not be in the interests of national security. If this is the 
case, the Senate has a variety of constitutional mechanisms to 
I express their displeasure with the contents of the treaty: 
1. They can vote to amend the text of the treaty,I which requires the consent of both nations involved. 
I 
2. They can state formal reservations during the 
ratification process. These reservations change U.S. 
I 
treaty obligations, although they may not affect the 
text of the treaty, and require the consent of the 
other party to the treaty. 
3. Senators can construct formal understandings, which 
are statements that clarify or elaborate on treatyI provisions, but do not require the consent of the 
I 4. They may make formal which are statements that 
Senate on matters relating 
alter them. 
other signer 
declarations 
express the 
This does not 
of the treaty. 
on the treaty, 
position of the 
to the treaty, but that are 
I not directed at the specific contents of the treaty itself. (above from a study prepared by the 
I 
Congressional Research Service 1984:11.) 
Additionally, the Senate has the option of passing a 
congressional resolution. A resolution is a mechanism which 
I suggests a direction or approach to arms control policy. The 
problem with this approach is that it lacks the force of law, and 
I 
I administrations are therefore not obligated to listen to this 
form of advice. Additionally, because the executive frequently 
conducts negotiations in secret, Congress may not be aware of the 
I manner in which their suggestions may contradict current U.S. 
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I 
I arms control policy (Cranston 1978:208-209). 
It appears that if Congress is completely at odds with 
I current arms control policy, it can adopt a constitutional 
mechanism which requires renegotiation of the treaty. Usually a 
I 
I president will not submit a treaty to Congress if s/he suspects 
that this level of discontent with the content of the treaty 
exists. 
I If senators simply desire that a treaty be adhered to in a 
certain manner, they may adopt the constitutional mechanisms 
I 
I mentioned above which are not binding upon the executive. 
Although these may appear to be alternatives which have no real 
impact upon U.S. interpretation of the treaty, it must be 
I remembered that adherence to all arms control agreements is the 
I 
sole responsibility of the Senate (Cranston 1978:212). In this 
I respect, Congress has a significant opportunity to shape the 
obligations of arms control treaties. The key word here is 
I 
opportunity. Although Congress has a variety of mechanisms with 
which to influence arms control, their use is dependent upon the 
will of the Senate. 
I 
I Members of Congress are often used as advisors and observers 
of delegates to arms control negotiations. The use of 
I 
congresspersons for this purpose began in 1977 with President 
Carter, who first appointed members of Congress to advise the 
U.S. SALT delegation (Jenson 1988:38). Since that time, members 
I of both the House and the Senate are routinely used in this 
capacity for all major treaties treaties (Congressional ResearchI 
I 
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I 
I Service study 1984:104; Jenson 1988:38; Talbott 1979:95). The 
effectiveness of this type of mechanism in influencing arms 
I control appears to be limited, however. Talbott notes that 
congressional advisors appeared to have little substantive impactI 
I 
on the progress and direction of the negotiations (1979:95). He 
does note one exception, it which members of congress insisted 
upon Soviet compliance in the matter of an "agreed data base" for 
I the purpose of treaty verification. Although the Soviets were 
unwilling initially, congressional lobbying evoked a change in 
I 
I their position on this matter (Talbott 1979:95-96). Although 
Talbott gives no explanation for this isolated incident of 
congressional influence on Soviet negotiators, one reason may be 
I that the Soviets feared that congressional concern over 
verification would uniquely jeopardize treaty ratification. On 
I 
I most matters of negotiating strategy, the Soviet and American 
negotiators may perceive that the resulting treaty could be 
"sold" to the Senate 1£ accompanied by the appropr iate 
I information and testimony. As Cranston notes, although 
congressional presence at arms control negotiations may serve to 
I 
I provide members of Congress with more information on the 
negotiations and more interest in the process, it does not give 
them a voice at the bargaining table itself (1978:210). In fact, 
I the typical result of having congressional involvement in arms 
control negotiations is that it increases the prospects for 
I 
I bipartisan support and minimizes the likelihood that the treaty 
will be challenged (Jenson 1988:38). In other words, by giving 
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I 
I Congress a minor role in the arms control process, a president 
can coopt those who may oppose the treaty for a very small price. 
I In this respect, congressional advisors and observers to arms 
control negotiations may actually serve to decrease the ability 
I 
I of congress to influence arms control. 
Another opportunity which can be utilized by Congress, in 
this case the Senate, to influence the course of arms control is 
I confirmation hearings. Jenson notes that because the Senate has 
the power to confirm top-level arms control negotiators, it may 
I 
I have some leverage for influencing arms control. The example he 
cites is the confirmation hearing of Paul Warnke as director of· 
the ACDA. Because some members of Congress were not enthusiastic 
I about the direction of Carter's arms control policy, they 
indicated to the president that Warnke would not be confirmed 
I 
I unless he promised them that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would play 
a greater role in the negotiations (Jenson 1988:35). In this 
manner, Congress may use confirmation hearings to extract 
I agreements from the president on the negotiation of arms control. 
I 
Additionally, the ease or difficulty with which an important
I figure in arms control is confirmed sends a signal to the 
president. If the vote is close, or if the appointment is not 
approved, the president should view it as a warning that Congress 
I is not supportive of the direction of arms control negotiations 
and may not ratify any resulting treaties. If the appointment is 
I easily approved, the president may be able to interpret the 
decision as indicating that the Senate trusts his/her choice ofI 
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that particular negotiator, and may have few objections to thefl 
I 
current course of arms control negotiations (Talbott 1979:56; 
I Cranston 1978:210-211). Confirmation hearings, then, may be a 
mechanism through which Congress can mold the parameters of 
I 
treaty negotiations, even if they are not present in the 
negotiating delegation itself. 
Senators may also use confirmation hearings as a vehicle to 
I obtain information on treaty negotiations. One example of this 
is Paul Nitze's confirmation hearing for the position of 
I 
I Ambassador while he served as head to the U.S. delegation to the 
INF negotiations. In this hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee held open and closed sessions with Nitze on the status 
I of current treaty negotiations (Congressional Research Service 
study 1984:95). A problem facing this mechanism for 
I 
I congressional influence is the use of persons who are not 
confirmed by the Senate to negotiate arms control agreements 
(such as the national security assistant). When an unconfirmed 
I negotiator is used, Congress is denied the opportunity to gather 
information on the qualifications and negotiating strategy of the 
I 
I individual, and is prevented from signalling to the president its 
expectations for arms control. 
Congress may also influence arms control through related 
I actions which may indicate their confidence level with respect to 
the president's foreign policy. For instance, Cranston notes 
I that in March of 1977, a large number of senators sent a letter 
to President Carter supporting his human rights position.I 
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I 
I Cranston interprets: "This action can be seen as a step toward a 
general foreign policy consensus that would support the president 
I in future major initiatives such as a SALT II treaty" (1978:211). 
Other such actions include the 1983 House resolution banning 
I 
I funding for ASATs despite the wishes of President Reagan; the 
1987 House defense authorization bill which banned spending for 
the deployment of nuclear weapons beyond the SALT II limits that 
I President Reagan intended to abandon; and the 1987 House ban on 
ASAT testing (Jenson 1988:36). These actions, which may seem 
I 
I unrelated to current treaty negotiations, are an indication to 
the president that Congress is dissatisfied with progress on arms 
control negotiations, and may intend to take autonomous action, 
I if necessary, to promote congressional arms control goals. At a 
I 
minimum, these actions can be seen as votes of "no confidence" on 
I current arms control policy. The Jackson Amendment to the SALT I 
treaty can also be seen as an action unrelated to SALT I, but 
I 
with the intent of signalling a loss of confidence with Nixon's 
arms control policy at that time. The purpose of the Jackson 
I 
Amendment was to warn the negotiators of a future SALT II treaty 
I of congressional expectations. Frye notes: "Seemingly innocuous 
on its face, the Jackson Amendment was a sophisticated maneuveer 
I 
to enhance the leverage which he and the Armed Services 
Subcommittee on SALT would have on future strategic arms 
negotiations" (1974:98). 
I Congress may also use its power to strengthen the voice of 
government agencies to influence the direction of arms controlI 
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I 
I negotiations. For instance, in the 1970s Congress created the 
Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget 
I Office to provide them with in-depth information on weapons 
systems, and also attempted to expand the capabilities of theI 
I 
General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service 
of the Library of Congress in order to expand their ability to 
investigate weapons programs (Platt 1978:4). Implementing such 
I changes 
control 
I 
I weapons 
was more 
budget, 
~..? ? provided Congress with more.. leverage 
because it enhanced congressional ability to 
systems and their effects on national security. 
in arms 
evaluate 
Congress 
able to make more informed choices on the defense 
and also in ratifying arms control agreements. 
I Congress also has the option of changing the statutory 
charter of the ACDA to allow it a stronger voice in arms controlI negotiations (Cranston 1978:207). This would probably change the 
I character of the negotiations due to the expanded power of a pro­
arms control actor. 
I Another area of congressional control which has the 
potential to affect arms control policy is the defense budget.
I Platt claims: 
I It is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended this power of the purse to be used extensively 
with regard to defense. Besides the appropriations 
clause, Article I provides that Congress shall "provideI for the common defense," and Articles 12, 13, and 14 give Congress the power "to raise and support armies," 
"to provide and maintain a navy," and "to make rules 
I for the government and regulation of land and naval forces" (1978:14). 
I
 These
 
I
 
I
 
responsibilities seem to indicate that Congress controls 
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I 
I defense policy through the authorization of military expenditures 
and the regulation thereof. Cranston claims: "Congress has the 
I most influence over arms policymaking in the area of weapons 
procurement. Through its annual defense budget, Congress can to 
I 
I some extent codify the overall strategy governing the acquisition 
and deployment of weapons systems" (1978:206). However, he 
notes: " ... the idea of integrating arms control considerations 
I into defense policy decisions has not been in any sense a 
I 
significant factor" (Cranston 1976:206). Additionally, Congress 
I has a reputation for approving the executive's proposed defense 
budget without making any major additions or subtractions (Aspin 
1978:43; Platt 1978:5). It appears that although Congress may 
I possess a mechanism to control defense policy and to also shape 
I 
arms control, it does not attempt to utilize it effectively.
I This is not solely because of a lack of ambition on the part of 
the Congress. Often, by the time a new weapons system comes ·up 
I 
for consideration in Congress, the bureaucratic momentum has 
taken hold, and the added support of the defense contractors and 
I 
unions involved in the project serve to push it along (Aspin 
I 1976:54). Aspin also notes that the military often determines 
the necessity of a certain weapons system long before Congress 
I 
ever sees the specific budget items (1978:54). Because the 
military and the bureaucracy, as well as outside interest groups, 
are committed to a weapons system very early, politically it 
I becomes very difficult for Congress to reject its development, 
whatever congressional arms control concerns may be.I 
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I In the 1980s, Congress began to use its pover over defense 
expenditures to pressure the executive to adopt a more positive 
I attitude tovard arms control. This approach utilized veapons 
systems as a bargaining chip to gain executive concessions onI 
I 
arms control proposals. Jenson notes that the build-dovn 
approach to START vas a result of 45 senators cosponsoring a 
resolution advocating the approach and making it clear that their 
I support of the MX missile vas dependent upon Reagan's adoption of 
their proposal (1988:221). In April of 1983 many congresspersons 
I 
I and senators, both Democrats and Republicans, tied the fate of 
the MX missile to "signs of increased 'flexibility' and 
'seriousness' in the administration's attitude tovard arms 
I control" (Garfinkle 1984:190). Reagan agreed to the approach 
insisted upon by Congress because of his advocacy of the MX 
I 
I (Jenson 1988:37). As a result, "arms control enthusiasts in 
Congress have apparently been handed a club to vie1d each time a 
vote arises on MX funding in the future" (Van Cleave 1984:19). 
I This example illustrates hov poverful of a mechanism control of 
the.defense bUdget can be if Congress chooses to exercise its 
I 
I authority. It is possible that the bargaining chip strategy vill 
be used more frequently in the future due to its success in 
pushing a president vho vas perceived as reluctant to the 
I negotiating table. 
I 
Hov congressional concerns may affect executive actions. In 
I addition to actual congressional actions affecting arms control, 
the known concerns of Congress may affect executive behavior as 
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I well. Cranston notes: "A prudent administration ... will have 
taken into account what the Senate is or is not likely to accept. 
I That is the gretest opportunity for congressional influence" 
(1978:212). Because the executive perceives members of CongressI 
I 
as having certain expectations for an arms control treaty, they 
may wish to meet some of these expectations in order to get the 
treaty ratified. One example of this is the negotiating posture 
I of Carter and Brezhnev on SALT II. Because it was perceived that 
Congress expected reductions more significant than the original 
I 
I Vladivostok levels, the two leaders committed themselves to 
cutting Vladivostok ceilings by 17 to 25 percent (Frye 1978:22). 
Additionally, General Rowny claims that the original START 
I proposal was preferred by the Reagan administration, but the 
build-down proposal was adopted to placate Congress (Jenson 
I 
I 1988:37). 
A president may also attempt to meet the request of certain 
influential senators in order to ensure ratification of a treaty. 
I Because in a Congress of 535 members it only takes 34 senators to 
block the ratification of a treaty, it is important that no 
I 
I influential individual is opposed to the treaty (Miller 1984:83). 
Throughout the 1970s, Senator Henry Jackson was one of the most 
important members of the Senate, and he attempted to use his 
I power to shape the nature of the treaties negotiated during that 
period. For these reasons, he may be viewed as a model for the 
I 
I type of opposition a president may have to anticipate and placate 
in Congress. Neustadt and May explain: 
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I Jackson was not just a human being, he was a United 
I 
states Senator. Carter and his aides would have done 
well to think of him as, for practical purposes, a 
small but powerful foreign country, with his own 
independent interests and his own equivalent of 
government departments (1986:202).
 
I Neustadt and Hay claim that it should have been a high priority
 
I 
of Carter's to negotiate with Jackson while they negotiated with 
I Brezhnev, "for advance concessions to either would doom thme 
treaty" (1986:202). This seems to indicate that a president 
I 
should anticipate the nature of the complaints of his/her 
strongest opposition, and then attempt to address these 
I 
complaints during the negotiation of the treaty. Jackson is not 
I an isolated example, but a typical one. Although Senator Jackson 
did not survive to trouble the Reagan administration, Senators 
I 
Cohen, Nunn, Gore, and Dicks forced changes in the START 
negotiations policy in much the same manner. A president should 
be prepared to listen to and negotiate with political opposition 
I in the Senate, or to coopt the senators by permitting them 
limited involvement in the treaty formulation process. Without 
I 
I this anticipation of congressional concern, an arms control trety 
may not be ratified. 
One issue which concerns all members of Congress is the 
I verification of an arms control treaty. To the extent that 
congressional concern about verification is voiced, the executive 
I 
I is likely to ensure that adequate means to detect cheating are 
explicit in the treaty. Failure of the executive to meet such 
congressional expectations will probably risk the ratification of 
I the treaty. Talbott notes that that during the SALT II 
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I negotiations, congressional advisors warned the negotiating 
delegation that they would oppose the treaty if it was not 
I completely verifiable (1979:192). He argues that throughout the 
history of SALT, a major concern has always been meetingI 
I
 
congressional expectations of verifiability, which became more
 
difficult throughout the 1970s as Congress became increasingly
 
skeptical (Talbott 1979:109).
 
I Problems in congressional influence. Most of the mechanisms
 
cited in this section require action by a cohesive House and
 
I
 
I Senate. However, in practice, cohesion is difficult to achieve
 
due to the fragmentation of responsibility among various
 
committees (Cranston 1978:209) and the ideological differences
 
I between the members of Congress themselves. This is a barrier to
 
the effective use of Congressional mechanisms to influence arms
 
I
 
I control.
 
Another problem faced by Congress in its attempt to
 
influence arms control policy is a lack of information. Frye
 
I explains: " ... for congressmen to be consistently effective on
 
complex questions of arms control, they must have multiple
 
I
 
I avenues of access to information ... " (1978:24). Yet, the prime
 
source of information for most persons in Congress remains the
 
executive branch. Dine points out:
 
I Control of information means control of policymaking.
 
I 
The executive branch, with a foreign policy-defense­
intelligence community of four and a half million 
people, has monopolized the collection, analysis, and 
I 
control of data (1978:64). 
Congressional power to influence arms control can therefore be 
I 50 
I 
I 
I limited by an executive branch which chooses to be uncooperative 
about information-sharing. According to Cranston, Congress often 
I has to operate in a vacuum, without access to vital information, 
and relegated to ineffectiveness in policymaking attemptsI 
I 
(1978:209). 
One attempt to rememdy this lack of Congressional 
information sources was the legislation which required the ACDA 
I to submit annual arms control impact statements. The goal of 
these statements was to provide Congress with information on 
I 
I weapons systems from an arms control perspective (Cranston 
1978:206). The ACIS, however, is widely regarded as ineffective 
in providing vital information. Cranston explains: 
I The law merely calls for a statement on the general impact of the weapons system on "arms control policy 
and negotiation." It does not require specificI information on what effect a may have, for example, on 
control of conventional arms 
I offer detailed guidelines on be most useful (1978:206). 
particular weapons system 
SALT or on prospects for 
transfers. Nor does it 
the information that would 
I Due to the inadequacy of information provided by government 
I 
sources, Congress has turned to private organizations such as the 
Arms Control Association, the Federation of American Scientists, 
Members of Congress for Peace through Law, the Council for a 
I Livable World, and the Center for Defense Information for 
detailed information and expert witnesses to testify about arms 
I 
I control and national security policies (Platt 1978:5; Frye 
1978:30). As outside resources increase congressional knowledge 
on arms control issues, it is expected that congressional 
I participation in arms control policymaking will also increase 
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I (Platt 1978:15). 
MilitarY 
I The "military" is often used as a collective term to 
describe the actions and motivations of those in the armed 
I 
I services and the Department of Defense. It Is difficult, 
however, to evaluate to the collective interests of such a group 
because the "military" is not a cohesive entity. In this 
I section, I will evaluate how each of the three components of the 
military serves to influence arms control. 
I 
I One component of the military is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
This group includes the highest ranking officer from each branch 
of the service, and a chair appointed by the president. The 
I chair of the JCS has advisory status in the National Security 
Council, and is usually represented in some fashion at all NSC 
I 
I meetings (Barrett 1985:129). Acting as a body, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) serve as the principal military advisor to the 
president (Barrett 1985:130). According to Kegley and Wittkopf, 
I the JCS have several duties: 
I 
As a body, the joint chiefs are responsible, among 
other things, for preparing strategic plans and 
I 
providing strategic and operational direction to the 
armed forces, and for advising the secretary of defense 
on military requirements as they relate to bUdget 
making, military assistance programs, industrial 
mobilization plans, and programs of scientific research 
and development. They are assisted in their tasks by aI joint staff comprising some 400 officers selected from 
I 
each branch of the armed forces (1987:385). 
Because the JCS have a great capacity to influence defense 
strategy, they are also accorded a great amount of influence in 
I evaluating arms control because, in part, they are perceived to 
I 
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I 
I be experts on the strategic requirements of national security. 
This power to influence arms control is particularly evident in 
I the ratification process of an arms control treaty. Moorer 
explains: "It is fair to say that Congress will not ratify or 
I 
I consent to ratification of a treaty dealing with military matters 
if the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't support it. I think every 
president is sensitive to that" (1987:75; also mentioned in 
I Seaborg and Loeb 1987; Clarke 1979; Panofsky 1979; Neustadt and 
May 1986; Fox 1982). A wise president will elicit JCS support 
I 
I for a treaty well before ratification (Fox 1982:53; Neustadt and 
May 1986:131). When the JCS find themselves in opposition to the 
president, they can rely on the support of congressional allies 
I to support their position. Because it is usually assumed that 
the JCS has the capability to collect the needed votes in the 
I 
I Senate to defeat a treaty, the president is often forced to 
bargain with the joint chiefs for their support (Seaborg and Loeb 
1987:452; Panofsky 1979:56). Fox notes: "That the joint chiefs 
I can charge a price for their support is obvious and a great 
source of strength in the bureaucratic politics of national 
I 
I security policy-making" (1982:54). 
The traditional price charged by the joint chiefs for their 
support of an arms control treaty has been increased defense 
I spending in areas not involved in the treaty. In order to obtain 
support for the SALT I treaty, Nixon offered to fund the testing 
I and deployment of MIRVs (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452; Neustadt and 
I May 1986:131). Such measures were also taken to secure the joint 
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I chiefs'support for SALT II. Talbott explains: 
... the prospective sacrifice of the HX and the 
I qualified acceptance of the Soviet definition of the Backfire as a medium, nonstrategic bomber--disgruntled 
the JCS when they found out about them. Later, when 
Brzezinski was asked why the comprehensive proposal hadI given the military more than it had asked for on cruise 
I
 
missile range, he replied that it was "the only way to
 
get the Chiefs on board" the entire proposal (1979:61).

I In the end, the JCS was able to get funding for the HX missile
 
project--to the tune of approximately 50 billion (Seaborg and
 
Loeb 1987:452).
 
I The bargaining power of the JCS is substantial. This
 
I 
permits them an important role in the formulation of arms control 
I policy. As a result of their contribution to the policy making 
process, the JCS is able to shape treaties to safeguard their 
interests. Once the negotiations are concluded, the JCS tends to 
I support the ratification of the treaty, although a price may be 
demanded for such support. 
I 
I Another component of the military is the officers in the 
armed services. Because of their expertise in matters which are 
I 
directly affected by arms control, such as the actual operation 
of weapons systems, they are accorded a measure of influence in 
the arms control process (Jenson 1988:30). This influence 
I manifests itself in what Kegley and Wittkopf refer to as the 
"military-congressional alliance." This alliance involves the 
I 
I connections of high level military officers to influential 
members of Congress, particularly those members in the four 
military committees (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:383; Jenson 
I 1988:30). This alliance, on occasion, has allowed the armed 
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I services to promote policies and programs which are not supported 
by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon (Kegley and Wittkopf 
I 1987:383). However, the alliance may be a detriment to the 
military in that the rivalries between the services may result in 
I 
I fragmented and contradictory demands (Kegley and Wittkopf 
1987:383). 
,Fragmentation occurs because, ultimately, each branch of the 
I service is attempting to justify its own existence. This means 
that "the Air Force will always lobby for bombers, the Army for 
I 
I tanks" (Berkowitz 1987:28). In arms control, as each branch of 
the service attempts to protect its own weapons systems, it may 
eagerly support measures which would affect the weapons systems 
I of the other branches (Jenson 1988:31). Because the armed 
services, particularly in matters of weapons curtailment, may not 
I 
I be able to form a cohesive group with well-defined demands, their 
influence on arms control may be diminished. 
In recent years, the influence of the armed services has 
I declined as the power of the Secretary of Defense has increased, 
I 
according to Kegleyand Wittkopf (1987:383). The Department of 
I Defense is considered to be an important source of power in 
influencing arms control (Clarke 1985:218; Kegley and Wittkopf 
I 
1987:382). One reason for this is because, as Clarke explains: 
"The Defense Department maintains a distinct 'sovereignty' over 
weapons and defense programs, although several of them relate 
I directly or indirectly to current or future arms control and 
foreign policy issues" (1985:215). When conflicts arise betweenI 
I 
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I the JCS and the Pentagon, the interests of the Secretary of State 
are usually accomodated (Moorer 1987:74). This attests to the 
I power structure within the military: the Secretary of State 
I rests atop the structure, the JCS is found in the middle layer, 
I 
and at the bottom lies the armed services. 
The progress of arms control negotiations is not likely to 
be aided by the Secretary of State. Clarke notes that the 
I Pentagon "is sometimes cautiously supportive of arms control 
measures," however, "neither by mission nor by disposition is DOD 
I 
I inclined to be the driving force for movement in the arms control 
field" (1985:200). Like the JCS, the Secretary of Defense may 
demand increased defense spending in return for support of an 
I arms control agreement (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:389; Seaborg and 
Loeb 1987:452). Because the Secretary of Defense plays such a 
I 
I key role in the formulation of arms control policy, the substance 
of agreements may be shaped by his/her desire to maintain 
existing weapons programs, and to leave options open for the 
I development of future systems. The result may be that the arms 
control treaties which are ratified are those which do not create 
I 
I radical changes in force structure or military policy. Treaties 
are more likely to impose minor changes on existing programs, 
while military spending is simply shifted to other weapons 
I programs. 
I 
As an entity, all components of the military appear to 
I approach arms control cautiously, demanding increased defense 
spending in exchange for their support of a treaty. The result 
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I 
I is that changes in composition of the nuclear arsenal, and in 
national security policy in general, are likely to be 
I incremental. 
I
 
I 
SOCIETAL FACTORS
 
Elite opinion
 
Political elites are those individuals who tend to set the 
I agenda for government policy. Since World War II, Dorman claims 
that the power of elites has become entrenched in the political 
I 
I system (1986:261). Elite attitudes are viewed as consistent, and 
resistant to change. Johnson claims that major prodding from 
activists among the masses is a necessary factor in promoting a 
I shift in elite attitudes (1987:252). Elite opinion, then can be 
viewed as a factor which exists in the political system and may 
I 
I have an influence on arms control. 
The difficulty in evaluating this factor is that there is no 
cohesive, clearly defined group that can be designated as "the 
I elite opinion makers." Some individuals and groups who may be 
classified as political elites support arms control; other such 
I 
I groups are opposed. 
Some authors perceive the political elites to be a voice 
which opposes arms control and refers to the Soviet Union as "the 
I evil Empire" (Johnson 1987:251). Johnson claims: "Since 1947, 
no foreign policy opinion held by elites and masses has been as 
I 
I consistent and potent as hostility toward the Soviet Union 
(1987:250). Others claim that political elites are forces which 
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I work for arms control (Hadstedt 1988; Mosher et.a1. 1987; O'Neill 
and Schwartz 1987), often to the detriment of U.S. interests (Van
I Cleave 1984; Wessell 1984). Van Cleave explains: 
I National political leaders .•. reinforce the political pressures on themselves; pressures that lead them to 
extol armH control, accomodate to achieve agreements, 
and then pretend that bad arms control is good armsI control. Those same pressures are then brought to oppose necessary defense programs and their proper 
funding (1984:14). 
I 
I It appears clear that there is no cohesive ideology binding 
together the elites in the political system. It is expected 
that political elites, as a structure, have no significant 
I influence on arms control policy. Diehl concurs with this 
I 
analysls: "A spllt among elltes over arms control polley 
I prevents the consensus needed to formulate a coherent arms 
control polley and an enllghtened bargalnlng strategy" (1987:12). 
I 
Publlc oplnlon 
Although publlc oplnlon Is recognlzed as a legltlmate factor 
in government policymaklng, it is dlfflcult to evaluate the 
I effect of pUbllc oplnlon on arms control. One reason for thls Is 
that arms control is not a sal lent issue in the mind of the 
I 
I public (Dlehl 1987:8; Panofsky 1979:14). The concerns arms 
control attempts to address are far removed from the everyday 
lives of most individuals. Surveys conducted during 1980 and 
I 1981 by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center and the 
Gallup Organizatlon found that less than 10 percent of the adult 
I 
I population in the U.S. mentioned the threat of war when asked to 
name the most Important problem they perceived to be facing the 
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I country (Schuman et.al. 1986:520). It has been suggested that 
I 
the reason the public does not perceive the threat of war to be 
I important is that most people are more concerned about problems 
which have a more immediate effect on their lives (Schuman et.al. 
I 
1986:528; Panofsky 1979:14; Seaborg and Loeb 1987:455). Because 
the public does not perceive the threat of nuclear war as an 
immediate and serious concern, it is not likely that they will 
I exert prolonged pressure on policymakers to reduce this threat. 
Typically, citizens do not critically evaluate theirI 
I 
thoughts on arms control; instead, they tend to support the 
positions endorsed by the political leaders with whom they agree 
j 
on other issues (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:455). Host people do not 
I understand what factors make war more likely (Diehl 1987:8), nor 
do they know what types of weapons should be limited in order to 
I 
prevent the threat of nuclear war (Diehl 1987:8). The inability 
to evaluate the the need for arms control in an analytical 
I 
fashion may prevent the public from forming deeply-held opinions 
I in this area. And, the absence of deeply-held convictions 
precludes consistency in public opinion.I Over time, public opinion on arms control is shifting and 
contradictory. The causes for this inconsistency are unclear. 
I 
One possible explanation is that public opinion changes when the 
I U.S.-Soviet relationship changes. Hiller suggests: " ••• public 
attitudes towards defense and arms control are schizophrenic.
I Put most simply, the pUblic fears both nuclear war and the Soviet 
Union, and the political climate of the moment is determined by 
I 59 
I 
I 
I which of these fears is predominant" (1984:87). The National 
I 
Academy of Sciences concurs with this analysis, explalninq: 
I "Public support for arms control has been closely linked with the 
varyinq fortunes of the U.S.-Soviet political relationship"I (1985:22). Throuqhout the 1970s, the American public has been 
viewed as anti-militaristic due to the disillusion suffered after 
I 
Vietnam and Waterqate. It is arqued that U.S.-Soviet relations 
I were fostered by this desire to curtail the power of the military 
establishment (Horris 1988:300). The Christian Science HoniterI claimed that by the 1980s, public opinion became more 
militaristic and anti-Soviet, with 58 percent of those polled by 
I 
the NBC News supportinq increased defense spendinq and 62 percent 
I favorinq the return of the military draft (Office of Research 
Coordination, CRS:1988:154). Blacker attributes the election I victory of Reaqan's 1980 campaiqn aqainst the SALT II treaty as a 
symbol of the popular decline of U.S.-Soviet relations (1987:99). 
Berkowitz, however, attributes the inconsistency of·public 
I opinion to chanqes in defense spendinq. He claims: 
••• each tiae defense spendinq beqan to rise, public 
support for cuttinq defense spendinq also beqan toI	 rise ••• Four decades of experience suqqests that the 
United States simply will not support annual defense 
bUdqets much above 260 billion for any lenqth of timeI	 --reqardless of whether or not the Soviets violate an 
aqreement (1987:85). 
I The time frame for each cycle of public opinion, accordinq to 
I 
Berkowitz, is five or six years (1987:84). Althouqh. Berkowitz's 
I madel claims that public opinion will be shifted by military 
spendinqreqardless of the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is 
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I possible that the underlying causes of both military spending and 
I 
political -detenteB are related. This, however, Is beyond the 
I scope of this paper. 
Whatever the cause, public opinion changes over time. These 
I 
changes manifest themselves in various ways. The public is 
generally regarded as simultaneously favoring both attempts at 
military superiority and the negotiation of an arms control 
I agreement (Blacker 1987:147; Paine 1986:278; Miller 1984:87). 
Because the implementation of both of these options is often-notI 
I 
politically feasible, the public can be viewed as lacking 
consistent support for arms control negotiations. 
I 
I 
Inconsistency Is also present when the public does profess 
I specific support for arms control. CBS and The Ney York Tiae9 
conducted a survey during the peak of the nuclear freeze campaign 
and discovered that 77 percent of the public supported a nuclear 
freeze In principle, yet only 2S percent said they would favor a 
freeze if It did not stop the Soviet Union from deploying weapons 
I (Berkowitz 1987:80). Additionally, 66 percent of the people in 
the CBS/Ney York Tlaos survey suspected that the Soviet Unl~n 
I 
I would cheat on an arms control agreement If given the opportunity 
(Berkowitz 1987:80). This conclusion has also been supported by 
a poll conducted for the Committee on the Present Danger (Adelman 
I 1984:244), in addition to research by Talbott (1979:31). The 
I 
effect of this attitude, according to Berkowitz, Is: BIf an arms 
I control proposal is exposed to pUblic scrutiny for any length of 
time, the debate will reveal any flaws In It. Those flaws drain 
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I 
I support, so that the arms control proposal that American 
I 
deaocracy favors today vill be the one it rejects tomorrov· 
I (1987:80). Arms control appears to be a short-term public 
interest vhich vill ultimately lose its appeal in the long ter•.I The effect of public opinion on arms control is ainimal. 
One reason for this is that such opinion Is inconsistent, and 
cannot provide constant, long-term pressure on policyaakers 
I (Diehl 1987:9). Also, because the public has little knovledge of 
I 
veapons systeas and-their strategic implications, public pressureI mayo-lack the credibility tovarrant sufficient attention (Diehl 
1987:8) • 
If public opinion is strongly in favor of aras control at a 
I given aount in time, it can stimulate a govern.ent decision to 
I 
return to the negotiating table (Diehl 1987:8; Sloss and Davis 
I 1987:34). An exaaple of this pover vas Reagan's re-opening of 
the START talks after the nuclear freeze movement gained 
moaentua, although many officials in his adainistration believed 
I such a move would be contrary to U.S. interests (Diehl 1987:9). 
I 
Once -aras control negotiations have been entered, hovever, public
'I opinion ceases to function as an influential factor because it is 
not powerful enough to affect the content or the tiaing -of-an 
agreement (Diehl 1987:8-10). 
I Me41a 
The mainstream aedia is the priaary source of information 
I about arms control for the vast majority of Americans. The 
images these aedia presents, then, may influence the Danner inI 
I 
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I 
I which the pUblic perceives arms control. According to columnist 
I 
TOil -Wicker, - an associate editor of the Hew York Tilles, -the 
I character of news policy is controlled by the League of 
Gentle.en, a group of owners and managers of the press 
I 
institution who have a tendency to support government policy 
(Dorman 1986:269). Dorman claims that the nature of reporting on 
arms control and other policy matters consistently fits into a 
I pattern which supports rather than questions official policy. He 
explains:I There is compelling evidence that the news media have 
consistently gone along With Washington's 
overstatements of Soviet strength and militaryI	 spending, generally supported increases in U.S. 
military spending, and usually questioned the 
deployment of new weapons systems only on the basis ofI	 whether they are sound invest.ents (1986:262). 
As a result of this tendency to support the official policyI line, the mainstream media present a consistent set of images to 
I tbegeneral pUblic upon which later perceptions of the merits of 
I 
arms control say be based. In late 1983, the GallUp organization 
I conducted-a study to determine the attitudes of journalists 
toward arms control. They found that while 81 percent ofI jourflalists surveyed favored an agreement between the u.S. -and 
the Soviet Union freezing the testing and deployment of nuclear 
weapons, only four percent answered "the nuclear arms race· when 
I asked what they considered to be the most important problem 
facing the country (Dorman 1986:267). This say be indicative ofI the degree of emphasis placed on the importance of arms control 
I
 in the
 
I
 
I
 
aainstrea. lIIedia. Additionally, when journalistsdo 
63 
I 
I report on arms control, critical analysis is usually left out of 
the picture. According to Robert Karl Manoff, an editor and 
I journalist: 
The press aay reflect and give vent to domestic 
differences over negotiating strategies, but when it 
I 
I comes to discussing the details and rationales of the 
other side's position, independent reporting stops at 
the water's edge (Doraan 1986:265). 
I 
Because journalists do not attempt to present arms control 
I in an impartial manner, unflattering images of the Soviet Union 
develop. Dorman claims: ·Soviet leaderships is routinelyI portrayed in the darkest of terms, and the bleakest motives are 
habitually ascribed to Soviet behavior· (1986:262). Kennan 
specifically claims that the news media presents an "endless 
I series of distortions and oversimplifications,· and is 
I 
responsible for the "systemic dehumanization of the leadership ofI another great country" and the "monotonous misrepresentation --of 
the nature and attitudes of another great people" (Dorman 
1986:263). This iaage is not only perpetuated bY::lournalists; 
I the entertainment media also paint the same dehumanizing portrait 
of the Soviet Union for American viewers. As Johnson notes, "The 
I 
I box-office success of current anti-Soviet combat films such as 
Rambo attests - to the continued popularity of Soviet-bashing" 
(1987: 251) • 
I The eff~ct of these unflattering images may be detrimental 
to the prospects for concluding an arms control agreement. 
I Kennan notes: 
The view of the Soviet Union that prevails today inI large portions of our governmental and journalistic 
I 
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establishments is so extreme, so subjective, so farI	 removed froB what any sober scrutiny of external 
reality would reveal, that is not only Ineffective but 
dangerous as a guide to political action (Dorman 
I 
I 1986:263). 
The interpretation of a particular agreement is usually done in 
I 
such a way as to discredit the motives of the Soviet Union 
(Dorman 1986:262). This does not facilitate pUblic support for 
I 
I 
aras control. 
I Nedia attention can be disruptive to arms control in other 
ways, as well. Adelman claims that the very act of observation 
of aras control agreements by the media changes the nature of the 
negotiations. He uses the term -Hawthorne effect- to describe 
this phenoaenon (Adelaan 1984:243). The "Hawthorne effect" is 
I used to refer to a group of individuals who deviate froa -their 
I 
norasl pattern of behavior when they are aware that their actionsI are-being observed. Adelman argues that the aaount of attention 
placed on aras control negotiations by the media reduces the 
effectiveness of such talks (1984:243). Specifically, Secretary 
I of State Holmes claims: 
••• it is clear that today's degree of publicity is not 
a neutral element in negotiations. It can influence 
I 
I the choice of positions on both sides; it can liait the 
degree of nuance which is possible; it can hinder the 
ability to explore options (1986:5). 
I 
This decrease in negotiating flexiblity due to aedia coverage, as 
I Ho1aes indicates, is not conducive to the conclusion of a 
autually acceptable aras control treaty.I The aedia asy also affect pUblic expectations of arms 
control negotiations. Bxaessive media attention to a suamit aay 
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I 
I raise the level of public expectations, and encourage the 
I 
I 
participants in the negotiations to ·play to the headlines" 
I (lfeihalller 1987:111). '!'his type of political posturing, as 
Weih.iller notes, does not pro.ote "effective discussion and 
coaaunication· (1987:111). 
Interest groups 
I 
For the purpose of this paper, an interest groap will be 
I defined as any group of individuals who have an interest ·in aras 
control policy and attempt to influence the formulation of thatI polley. 'there are large nuabers of such groups in existence ·In 
the United states today, each with its own set of goals. This 
paper will investigate the mechanisms used to promote the goals 
I of interest groups, but not the goals themselves. Hy intent is 
to discover the ways in which interest groups aay influence the 
I 
I aras control process. 
One aechanism used by interest groups to influence aras 
control policy is.c~lgn faDlllng. Groups aate contributions to 
I certain-senators and representatives in order to keep in office 
I 
those legislators who aay support their goals. A wide variety-ofI interest groups aate caapaign contributions to influence the 
nature of aras control policy. 80me of these groups include: 
unions who are involved in defense-industry work; political 
I action coaaittees representing defense contractors I ailltary 
I 
interest groups such as the Navy League and the National Guard 
I Associa~ion; organizations with a solely conservative agenda such 
as the National Conservative Political Action Co..ittee; and 
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I organizations with as decidedly liberal bent such as the Council 
I 
for·a Livable World. These groups raise aillions of dollars for 
I the reelection campaigns of legislators who can help promote 
their-· agendas. Those groups who oppose aras control tend to 
I 
spend more aoney to fund legislative campaigns than those groups 
which,·.support aras control. Por instance, the berican 'Security 
Council, a group which opposes aras control efforts, by itself 
I has . expenditures which surpass those of interest gr~ups 
supporting ar8S control (Clarke 1979:159). Although suchI 
I 
caapaign contributions by conservative groups cannot elect a 
Congress opposed to arms control, they can help to ensure the 
I 
election of a legislator who is receptive to their views. 
I Interest groups with an agenda directed specifically at arms 
control know that alone, they cannot influence policy. TheyI contribute to election campaigns to provide themselves the 
support of an individual who can play an influential role. 
I 
Interest groups aay also influence policy to the extent that 
I i-ndividuals vi·thin these groups aay be selected for posltlone·-ln 
·tbe·.pollcyaalllng establlsbaent. Parenti notes that pollcyaakersI and advisors are often drawn from the ranks of such policy groups 
as· the Council on Poreign Relations (CPR), the Trilateral 
I 
Commission, the Coamlttee for Bconoalc Developaent, the Business 
I Council, and the Buslness Roundtable (1989:196). Parenti claiaa 
that at tiaes, these groups have "Virtually monopolized theI meabershlp of the Rational Security Councll" (1989:197). -Por 
instance, President Pord appointed 1. aembers of the CPR to his 
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I administration (Parenti 1989:196), President carter appointed 17 
members of the Trilateral Co__ission, including himself and vice­
I president Mondale (Parenti 1989:196), and President Reagan hired 
30 erR members as advisors, in addition to a dozen CVR· meabersI 
I 
placed in top administrative positions such as Alexander Haig and 
George Shultz (Parenti 1989:197). 
I 
The Committee on the Present Danger, founded in 1976 to 
I oppose SA[,T II and to warn of the illpend ing Soviet -mU itary 
bUildup, found more than one-sixth of its 182 members appointedI to ..leading positions in the Reagan administration, some of which 
were in the area of arlls control (Office of Research 
I 
Coordi·nation, CRS 1988:82). The most well-known lIIember of the 
I COllllittee on the Present Danger is Paul Mitze, who, through his 
e.fforts to prevent the ratification of SA[,T II in 1979, earnedI "the political credentials for a job with Ronald Reagan· 
(Freedman 1988:28). It appears that established foreign·policy 
interest groups are fertile recruiting grounds for governllent 
I eaployees. 
I 
The primary contribution made by interest groups to the arllsI control process lies in their ability to act as Inlor..~lon 
·sources-IOIl COngress (Clarke 1979:164). Clarke claiDs that in 
the aftermath of the ASM treaty, members of ·Congress were no 
I longer willing to rely on solely the executive branch for 
I 
information, and they turned to other organizations for advice 
I and analysis on national security issues (1979:164). 
An example of how an interest group can influence .eabers of 
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I Congress can be seen in the activities of the Aras Control 
I 
Association (hereafter referred to as ACA). The ACA's activities 
I are typical of interest groups with an aras control agenda, 
whether the group is opposed to or in support of aras control 
I 
measures. ACA is a nonprofit, tax-exeapt organization which does 
not foraally consider itself to be a lobby (Clarke 1979:·163). 
I 
I 
However, among its own aembership, ACA is perceived as an 
I interest group. Its aeabers offer advice to meabers of COR9ress 
upon request, and are in frequent contact with friends in the 
House and Seante. The executive director aay have Inforaal·phone 
conversations With individual legislators several times a week. 
I 
I 
These contacts l118y influence the position legislators take··on 
I arms control issues (Clarke 1979:164). ACA does not only 
interact directly with Congress, but it is also involved in 
public education through conferences and symposiums in the U.S. 
and abroad, press briefings, university speakers, and interviews 
I 
on radio and television (Clarke 1979:163). Additionally, ACA 
I aeabers have assisted in the drafting of legislation affecting 
the ACDA through consultation with Congressman Zablocki (ClarkeI 1979:164). Through these activities, ACA is able to-influence 
policy by promoting public awareness and providing members of 
Congress with information used to aake decisions affecting aras 
I control polley. Many interest groups with a specific agenda 
geared toward opposing or supporting aras control operate ··1-n a 
I 
I fashion similar to ACA. 
In addition to foraal organizations which seek to 
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I influence national security policy, individuals representing 
certain classes of people may be considered interest groups for 
I 
I the purpose of this paper. One such informal group of 
individuals is weapons laboratory scientists and technicians. 
I 
These individuals, like some formal organizations, have an 
interest· in.influencing arms control policy. In general, those 
who work in weapons labs are opposed to aras control. They 
I attempt to influence policy by pressuring the president, the 
Pentagon, and by providing testimony to members of Congress.I 
I 
There is also a special category of groups which act in"such 
a way as to influence policy, yet have no specific agenda outside 
I 
I 
of research. Although not classified as interest groups, the 
I actions of these organizations, through research and their role 
as consultants to Congress, may influence arms control policy. 
These organizations include think-tanks such as the Brookings 
Institution, the RAND Corporation, the Institute of Defense 
Analysis, and the Hudson Institute. The role these organizations 
I perform may, in so.e respects, resemble that of an interest 
. group,' however, they retain an i.partial agenda.I 
I BXTBRHAL BHYIROHKBHT 
Allies·
 
I It is expected that the u.s. would be concerned about the
 
I 
op!~ions of its allies when conducting aras control negotiations.
I The specific role played by allies in the arms control process, 
then, should be evaluated. 
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I Allies aay affect arms control by exerting pressure on the 
I 
United states to conclude an aras control agreement with the 
I Soviet Union. Sloss and Davis note: " •••U.S. allies have 
significant Influence on the U.S. position in negotiations with 
I 
he· USSR that affect their Interests· (1987:351 also In ·Diehl 
1987:9). The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS claims 
that such pressure caused President Reagan to revise his ·!tlF 
I proposal in Karch of 1983 (1988:216). It appears that even with 
the most reluctant of presidents, concerted allied deaands aay 
I 
I cause a change in the U.S. negotiating posture. 
Allies aay also limit·U.S. flexibility once negotiations ·are 
I 
underway (Office of Research coordination, CRS 1988:184). One 
I ·auch example is French and British pressure on the Reagan 
administration to conclude an agreement on intermediate-rangeI 
'" nuclear forces, and their unWillingness to allow their own ·IMF 
weapons to be discussed. This type of infleXibility may serve to 
inMbl·t the progress of negotiations. 
I The role of allies in negotiations which do not directly 
concern Buropean weapons systeas is unclear. Host authors cite 
I 
I U.S. briefings of allies on the progress of such negotiations, 
but the role of allies in the foraulation of aras control policy 
is not expllcit-ly _ntiofted. It:- seeas llkely that allies are not 
I given a strong voice in aras control negotiating strategieswh!cb 
do not affect thea directly. The wisdoa of this approach should 
I 
I be a aatter for further investigation. 
Soviet Cooperation 
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I One of the most obvious factors to consider is Soviet 
cooperation and, willingness to negotiate an aras control 
I ~greeaent. The deteraination of such willingness is, of course, 
based upon Aaerican perceptions of Soviet intentions. TheI 
I 
dUflcultyl1es in the fact that berican observers are -not ,In 
agreeaent over past Soviet intentions or the aotivation for their 
I 
I 
present behavior. Host observers agree that Soviet negotiating 
I behavior is shaped by phases which are influenced by both 
doaestic ,and international events. They see the Soviets as'aore 
accoaodating in peri04s of low stress. However, at any given 
point in tiae, there are likely to be multiple interpretations of 
I 
Soviet intentions in aras control. 
I For exaaple, soae observers claia that from 1981 through 
1983, the Soviets were not interested in serious negotiations. 
These observers argue that the Soviets siaply wanted to,block 
I u.S. deployaent of interaediate-range forces in Europe while 
I 
_intianing their -own ·aonopoly of such aiss11es (Shultz in-~1IlA. 
I IIF Treaty 1988:17), and they were in a period of political 
paranoia due to leadership instability (Office of ResearchI Coordination, eRS 1988:59; Gray 1987:49). Other observers cite 
Brezhnev's peace offensive of 1981 and 1982 as an indication of 
Soviet willingness to negotiate in that era (Office of Research 
I Coordination of eRS 1988:xlvlll), as well as the 1983 efforts of 
I 
Andropov to reduce Soviet IIF forces to French and British 
I levels, the Soviet's proposal to ban ASATs, and their proposed 
nuclear test ban (Parenti 1989:180-1). Alexander Haig claims 
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I that in the early years of the Reagan administration the Soviets 
I 
vere eager to enter arms control negotiations on alaost any basis 
I (KccGvlre 1981:38). 
As exeaplified here, there is disagreement aaong scholars 
I 
vbo specialize In·the Soviet Union as to the legltiaacy of Soviet 
negotiating-intentions at any given time. What tbese scholars do 
I 
I 
agree·on,hovever, Is the Importance of observing Soviet behavior 
I and attempting to ascertain their arms control objectives in 
order to facilitate· aeaningful aras control agreeaents.The 
iaportance of Soviet cooperation and villingness to engage in 
serious negotiations as a factor In the arms control process'·ls 
I 
I 
not in question. What does need to be resolved is an accepted 
I method for evaluating Soviet Intentions. Such a aethod vould be 
a useful tool in predicting propitious periods in vhich to 
.negotiate, and vould help to explain vby soae past atteapts have 
failed. It aust be reaembered, hovever, that their can be no 
completely accurate aethod of deterainlng Soviet Intentions 
I because any assessaent vould be tainted by the nature of u.s. 
perceptions, and aay be susceptible to aanipulatlon by the 
I 
I bureaucratic interests involved.
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As ve have already seen, presidential transitions in the 
I United States have the effect of delaying aras control 
I 
negotiations, and may also result in hasty, poorly-planned
I positions vhen negotiations do begin. The Soviet Union also 
experiences transitions in leadership. Although during the 1910s 
I 13 
I 
I 
I the leadership In the Soviet Union was dominated by Leonid 
Brezbnev, the 1980s saw the rise to power of three new Soviet 
I leaders: Yurl Andropov, Konstantin Chernento, and Mikhail 
Gorbachev (additionally, Brezhnev was still In power at theI 
I 
begnlnnlng of the decade, for a total of four leaders). These 
two phases of Soviet leadership aay be helpful In evaluating the 
I 
I 
effect of Soviet leaders on aras control negotiations. 
I Talbott cia las that the reason SALT negotiations persisted 
throughout the 1970s under three different U.S. presidents was 
due to the ·collectlve leadership almost obsessed with preserving 
the continuity of the negotiations In the face of political 
change· (1979:21). Under Brezhnevand his elite policy-asking 
I circle, a standard Soviet position was maintained and SALT I and 
II were signed (although the latter was not ratified by the 
I 
I U.S.). 
The about-face In the 1980s, with up to four Soviet leaders 
dealing-With a single U.S. president has, as many several authors 
I	 claim, led to to a stagnation In Soviet arms control polley 
(Adelaan 1984/5:246; Jenson 1988:242; Blacker 1987:133; Gray 
I 
I 1987:52). Manifestations of this stagnation Include 
Inflexibility, and a lack of creative Initiatives by Soviet 
leaders. Blacker, however, claims that the positive aspect of 
I these leadership changes was an increase In Internal debate on 
foreign polley Issues. Although he clalas that the debating was 
I 
I seal-public, occurred within proscribed llalts, and ended when a 
high-level decision had been reached, he points out that It 
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I indicates competition and posturing on the part of officials 
co.peting for power (1987:144). This Is si.llar to what takes 
I place during election periods in the United states. It also 
indicates that there .ay not be stagnation on an internal level,I with new issues being raised and discussed. It is curious, 
I however, that Soviet outward polley has not changed as a result 
I 
of internal debate. 
I One reason that Soviet policy does not change after 
leadership changes .ay be that time is required for SovietI leaders to consolidate· their power with the policy-.aklng elite. 
'l'heSenate Co_lttee on Foreign Relations has esti.ated this 
consolidation period to a three- to eight-year process (~ 
I . United States and the SOviet Unlon; Prospest, for the 
I 
Relationship 1983:6). This explanation, however, aay not beI adequate. A study by the Office of Research Coordination of the 
eRS notes that when General Secretary Oorbachev began talks with 
President Reagan, he was operating fro. a strong political base 
I although he had only been in office for 254 days (1988:308). 
I 
This may indicate that a long period .ay not be required for the 
I consolidation of political poyer in the Soviet Union; others 
would argue that Oorbachev stU I has not attained the political 
base he needs to ensure the stability of his leadership position 
I within the party. 
I 
In addition to the effect of leadership transition, another 
I aspect of Soviet leadership to be exa.lned Is the effect of 
different leaders on Soviet arms control policy. &aong scholars, 
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I 
I	 disagreement exists as to vhether changes in leadership result in 
I 
changes in policy. Soae authors believe, for exaaple, that 
I General Secretary Oorbachev is a unique force in U.S.-Soviet 
relations. The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS claias 
I 
that the fundaaental differences between Oorbachev and his 
predecessors are: 1) A aodified version of Marxisa which 
eaphasizes cooperation over confrontation and sees a nuclear var 
I as an unwinnable catastrophe, 2) A recognition of global 
interdependence as a co..on factor between all nations, and 3)I 
I 
Historical revisionism and a less structured view of Marxist 
interpretation of history, vith conteaporary history seen as 
I 
I 
closer to reality (l988:lxxl1). Additionally, Gorbachev is seen 
I as one of the only Soviet leaders who has been interested in 
sloving the pace of military investment (Morris 1988:417). The 
Soviet proposals introduced by Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit 
are seen as the bold policies of a new generation of Soviet 
leaders (Sloss and Davis 1987:20). The extent to vhich Oorbachev 
I	 Is symbolic of a new generation of Soviet leaders reaains to be 
seen. It is uncertain as to vhether, once the Soviet econoay 
I 
I stabilizes (assuaing this happens, which is also uncertain), the 
Soviet leadership viII continue to advocate ailitary concessions 
in the fora of aras control negotiations, or whether they viII 
I revert back to third vorld expansion and resume their ailitary 
. buildup on a stronger econoaic foundation. There appears to be 
I 
I no agreement on this issue. 
Just as there are soae indications that the Soviet Union is 
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I moving tovard a more cooperative approach to arms control and 
international relations, there are also some factors for 
I continuity in the Soviet system. One important factor for arDS 
control ,negotiations is the presence of Soviet negotiators vhoI 
I 
have had several decades of experience, such as Yakov A. Halik, 
Vladimir Semenov, SeDyon K. Tsarapkin, and Viktor P. Karpov 
I 
I 
(Jenson 1988:51). It seems likely that seasoned negotiators viII 
I adhere to a particular style of bargaining; In this area, Soviet 
behavior may have elements similar to the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Additionally, in cases such as the transition from Brezhnev 
to Andropov, the new leader had been involved in the formulation 
I 
I 
o.f·· arms control policy under his predecessor and thus the 
I transition had little impact upon negotiations (Jenson 1988:21). 
Because Soviet foreign polley Is often determined by a very 
small, elite group, unless changes in leadership result In 
serious purges at the top, many elements of arms control polley 
I 
are not likely to change. 
I Another factor vhich many precipitate continuity in Soviet 
arms control policy is the ideology vhich governs the SovietI vorld view (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:1xxvii). 
Harxist-Leninlst ideology is a common element in all Soviet 
leaders, and although Gorbachev may appear to have a aore liberal 
I interpretation of this ideology, It is likely that there viII be 
a common thread between his arDS control polley and that of other 
I 
I Soviet leaders. The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS 
clalas that Gorbachev Is a product of his culture, and has the 
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I same "ideological ingredients, political aspirations, and 
essentially revolutionary strategy and tactics •.• strong1y 
I influenced by the traditionalisa of Russian nationalism" 
(1988:247). 7hey coapare the spirit in Gorbachev's speeches toI 
I 
that evident in the speeches of Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov 
(1988: 247). 
I 
I 
Another factor which encourages continuity is the nature of 
I the Soviet political systea itself. The Office of Research 
Coordination of the CHS claims that one of the most notable 
aspects of that political system is its rigidity, and the tough 
character of the Soviet elite. Because they see the 
I 
I 
institutional characteristics of the Soviet system as unchanging, 
I they see little likelihood for change in Soviet policy 
(l988:1xxvi). It is difficult to ascertain the affects of Soviet 
leadership on aras control. On the one hand, it is apparent that 
when there are several leadership changes in rapid succession, 
I 
Soviet aras control policy lack innovation and flexibility. And, 
I traditionally, Soviet leaclership has aaintained a relatively 
consistent arms control policy despite changes in leadership. OnI the other hand, it is unclear whether Gorbachev syabo1izes a 
change in Soviet policy. Although in aany ways he appears to be 
a unique force in the po1icymaking estab1ishaent, there are also 
I Dany pressures for continuity, both internally and externally. 
I 
Internally, the decision-aaking bocly of the Soviet Union -is 
I entrenched. Bxternally, the prevailing iuge of the Soviet Union 
in the -United States aay also prove to be resistant to change. 
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I Because U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions are an important 
factor in determining arms control strategies, the effect of 
I Soviet leadership changes may be li.ited by the degree to which 
I
 U.S. perceptions are altered.
 SOviet ActiQns Ind intornational events 
I Nany authors agree that international events can affect the 
I 
progress of ar.s control negotiations. Diehl claims: 
I " ••• another precondition of successful ar.s control is the 
absence of controversial political events (or a series of events 
I 
as in the Cold War) during the arms control negotiation process" 
(1987:14; also noted in Jenson 1988). Diehl believes that the 
I 
global context of negotiations can influence the scope of the 
I agreement, as well as the likelihood that an agree.ent will be 
concluded (1987:3). The Office of Research Coordination for the 
I 
CRS notes that external events affect ar.s control on three 
different levels. They explain:· 
I 
Negotiators and their work are inevitably linked to 
external historical forces and cannot, therefore, avoid 
the negative consequences when these forces are no 
longer congenial. For there is a line connecting the 
negotiating table to diplomacy and diplomacy to the 
larger province of international politics. Only whenI conditions are right at all three levels, particularly 
I 
the determining level 
this line be firmly 
assured. For success 
converging interests, 
diplomacy, but itI international politics(1988:147). 
of international politics, can 
secured and success therefore 
in negotiations depends upon
the outcome of success in 
ultimately depends on the 
that shape these interests 
I In the' negotiating posture of the United states, external 
events are deliberately connected to the progress of arms control 
I through a process of IJnkage. This concept is best defined by 
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I 
I President Mixon, who explicitly advocated such a policy during 
his adainistration: 
I I should like to make clear that I view arms 
limitations talks in the context of our overall 
relations with the Soviet Union. While I do notI advance explicit preconditions for the opening of talks 
and will stipulate none for their continuing, I do 
believe that, to be aeaningful, progress in arms 
limitation must be accompanied by progress in theI solution of critical political probleas .•• (Diehl
1987:13) • 
I	 The effect of linkage on arms control may be positive if U.S.­
Soviet relations are already congenial (Diehl 1987:13); however, 
I 
I when relations are strained, linkage may cause complications in 
concluding an arms control agreement. 
In contrast, the Soviet Union seldom links the prog~ess of 
I aras control to unrelated issues. The Soviet agenda appears 
advocate the conclusion of aras control agreeaents without 
I 
I consideration of other issues to be 
inappropriate (united states and the Soviet union: Prospects for 
I 
the Relationship 1983 :v). 
I The effects of linkage, in addition to the manner in which 
other international events influence aras control, can beI illustrated by a brief examination of the external environment 
during the negotiation of SALT I, SALT II, and START/IMF. 
The negotiation of SALT I began in the late 1960s, with 
I President Johnson's initial attempts to begin a dialogue with the 
i 
Soviet Union. These attempts were ended abruptly by the Soviet 
I invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968. This was the first 
exaaple of the U.S. linking the fate of the negotiation of 
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I strategic nuclear weapons to Soviet actions elsewhere. SALT I 
also deaonstrated the Soviet's unwillingness to iapose a policy 
I' 
I of linkage on aras control negotiations with the U.S. The 
Soviets allowed SALT I to be concluded despite their displeasure 
I 
with the U.S. bombing of Hanoi. Soae political analysts believe 
that had the U.S. blockaded Horth Vietnaa earlier in the 
negotiations, progress might have been iapeded. However, because 
I it happened so close to the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviets 
decided to forgo linkage for what they viewed as a aore importantI 
I 
national priority (Roberts 1974:27). 
During the SALT II negotiations, the political environment 
I 
became a more important factor influencing the progess of the 
I talks. Of primary importance were several incidents of perceived 
Soviet aggression. One area which hindered the progress of SALT 
I 
II was Soviet involvement in Africa. The reliability of the 
Soviet Union as a negotiating partner was in question after the 
I 
invasion of Angola by 12,000 Cuban troops (Hosher et.al. 
I 1987:205). Soviet backing of the Bthiopian aray in a conflict 
with Somalia also served to create anxiety in the U.S. aboutI Soviet intentions. When asked why SALT II was never ratified by 
the United States Senate, Brzezinski claimed that the treaty 
-11es buried in the sands of the Ogaden- (Blacker 1987:102). In 
I the Senate, .any critics of the treaty encouraged fellow senators 
I 
to withdraw their support in order to punish the Soviet Union forI what was perceived as a Soviet policy of expansion in the third 
world (Blacker 1987:121), and the election caapaigns of 1978 were 
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I 
I filled with attacks on Soviet intervention in Africa (Talbott 
1979:203). Soviet action in Africa contributed to a decline in 
I public and congressional support for SALT II. 
The issue of the Soviet combat brigade was another incidentI of-perceived Soviet expansion which served to complicate SALT II 
I negotiations. In August of 1979, a Soviet combat brigade was 
"discovered" in Cuba. Congressional attention to this issue 
I delayed debate about SALT II for weeks, and evoked memories of 
the Cuban aissile crisis in the ainds of the public before it wasI discovered that the troops had been on the island since the early 
I 1960s. According to the Office of Research Coordination of the 
eRS, there were three serious negative effects of the coabat 
I brigade issue: 
I
 --It delayed treaty debate a precious month.
 
--It rekindled deep suspicions in the aaerican mind 
about Soviet behavior in the Third world, even though
the combat brigade issue proved to be a "phony one" andI	 the Soviets without direct fault; nonetheless, they
contributed to creating a cliaate in which Aaerican 
suspicions could be inordinately aroused.I 
--But whether phony or not, the issue linked Soviet 
behavior internationally to the fate of the treaty and 
in the weaks ahead that behavior; naaely, the Soviet 
I 
I invasion of Afghanistan, became a decisive factor in 
bringing the ratification process to an abrupt halt 
(1988:129). 
The final blow to the SALT II treaty came with yet another 
I incident of perceived Soviet expansion--the invasion of 
Afghanistan. Diehl claims that although the impact of the event 
I was short-lived, its timing was such that it was a crucial factor 
I in damaging the treaty (1987:14). Afghanistan "gave the coup de 
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I grace to the already seriously eroded and weakened mutual policy 
of detente established in Kay 1972· (Garthoff 1985:967). U.S. 
I policy, as a result, shifted from retren~haent to global neo­
containment (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:72).I There is some question as to whether the U.S. reaction to the 
I invasion was appropriate. Garthoff claims: 
As perceived at the time, it •••called for a visible 
reinforcement of a policy of containment againstI further Soviet expansionist moves in Southwest Asia. But it did not require that the administration make 
further relations with the Soviet Union hostage to a 
continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. NorI did the Soviet action in Afghanistan, even if it were 
deemed to reflect an opportunistic attempt to expand 
the Soviet domain, represent "the greatest threat to 
I 
I peace since World War II,· as carter repeatedly
characterized it, or even conceivably mean that "our 
own Nation's security was directly threatened· 
(1985:967). 
Policymakers in the U.S. chose to react to the invasion in aI hostile fashion which prevented further progress on negotiations. 
I Garthoff argues that some officials in the Carter administration 
who favored a rapid military buildup were able to capitalize on 
I the Afghanistan invasion in order to impleaent their agenda 
(1985:975).
I Originally, carter's intent was to suspend arms control 
I negotiations in the short tera until the Soviets withdrew froa Afghanistan. Garthoff explains: "Initially some effort was made 
I to. distinguish between temporary punitive sanctions levied on 
particular activities, and preserving the underlying structure of 
I the detente accords· (1985:969). However, Garthoff argues that 
I
 carter did not adopt a
 
I
 
I
 
consistent policy to support his posture 
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I 
I of confrontation and aspiration for detente (1985:971). As a 
result: 
I 
I •••measures intended to be demonstrative and temporary
in fact became governing. while intended to have a 
.ore limited (but significant) impact, the vhole range
of sanctions and other measures predictably-­
I 
inescapably--disaantled the framework of detente 
(Garthoff 1985:969).I Garthoff claims that carter's decision to exert external pressure 
on the Soviets instead of resolVing the threat through 
constructive dialogue only served to prevent the resuaption of 
I meaningful negotiations in the future (1985:970). 
I 
The SALT II negotiations were also complicated by actionsI initiated by the United States. For instance, the U.S. decision 
to tie the progress of arms control negotiations to Soviet 
emigration policy for Russian Jew§ served to hinder the progress 
I of the talks (Diehl 1987:13). 
The U.S. also coaplicated negotiations by formally 
I 
I recognizing China. The Soviets say this rapprochement as 
threatening to their strategic interests in Asia. After Deng 
visited the United States, a Soviet diplomat in Washington said, 
I "We are nov in the post-Deng era of Soviet-American relations. 
This means that things that vere possible tvo months ago in SALT 
I are no longer possible now· (Talbott 1979:251). The Soviet 
Union, according to Talbott, began to explicitly endorse theI 
I 
policy of linkage when the U.s. resuaed diploaatic relations with 
China. As a reSUlt, progress on SALT was halted and the summit 
date vas set back six months. During this lull in negotiations, 
I the combat brigade issue surfaced, which helped to prevent the 
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I ratification of SALT II (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 
I 
I 
1988:141). This example illustrates how U.S. actions may be 
I interpreted as threatening by the Soviet Union, and may create 
Soviet-i.posed linkage. In the same way as U.S.-created linkage 
undermines the progress of arms control, so'do Soviet linkages. 
It is not clear, however, what criterion the Soviet Union uses to 
determine the threshhold U.S. actions must reach to induce arms 
I 
I control linkage. 
In addition to U.S. and Soviet actions which may beI perceived as provocative, other events in the international 
environment may poison the progress of arms control. Garthoff 
claims: 
I	 The Iranian hostage crisis overshadowed all other 
aspects of international affairs, including relations 
with the Soviet Union, and it also impinged on them by
aggravating American feelings of i.potence and 
I 
I frustration. In turn, these feelings contributed to a 
dissatisfaction with the perceived fruits of detente, a 
heightened uneasiness over Soviet military strength, 
and a desire to reassert American power and will 
(1985:966). 
I The course of the START and IMF negotiations have suffered 
from siailar types of setbacks. The events which occurred during 
I 
I the negotiation of SALT I and II simply demonstrate the daaaging 
effect that the external environment may have on ar.s control. 
From a historical perspective, it appears that arms control may 
I be adversely affected by both U.S. and Soviet actions which 
trigger the perception that either side is not serious about arms 
I control negotiations. The degree to which unrelated actions are 
I
 linked to
 
I
 
I
 
arms control depends upon a variety of societal and 
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I governmental interests, as well as the international environment 
I 
in -general. It is clear, however, that when a country chooses-to 
I treat an action as hostile, negotiations will be jeopardized 
because of the distrust underlying the accusation and the 
I 
resentment with which the accusation will be received. Actions 
by third parties may also complicate arms control if they are 
perceived to threaten a nation's security. 
I 
STRATBOIC BHVIROHMBHTI VerificatiQn 
I	 One important coaponent of technology, as it affects arms 
control, is verification. Berkowitz distinguishes between the 
I concept of monitoring an aras control agreement and the concept 
of verification of a treaty. He explains:I	 Monitoring refers to the technical process of gathering 
information and depends on such factors as photographic
resolution, detectable communication signals, andI	 caaouflage. Verification refers to the use of this 
information to decide whether an arms control agreement 
has been violated. Verification thus involvesI political factors such as judgment, the willingness to 
risk cheating, and the willingness to suffer the 
political fallout of an accusation of a violation.I Verification is monitoring capability multiplied by 
I 
politics (1987:69). 
As this definition suggests, verification has both technological 
and political components. 
I Technologically, methods to monitor arms control agreements 
must exist for verification to be effective. The Arms Control 
I 
I and Disarmament Agency notes that the technology developed in the 
1960s and 1970s allowed verification of arms control agreements 
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I limiting the number of launchers by national technical means~ 
(ACDA Annual Report 1984:10). The agreements made possible by 
I the ability to monitor launchers were SALT I and II. These 
agreements placed ceilings on certain weapons systems, and 
I 
I counted launchers to ascertain treaty adherence. 
Willrich concurs with this analysis, noting that because the 
Soviets would not allow on-site inspection or surveillance by 
I	 aircraft (as exemplified by the U-2 incident), national technical 
means was essential to ,arms, control in the late,1960s and early 
I 
I 1970s. In particular, he claims that NTH was an important factor 
1n concluding SALT I (1974:260). Daniel Papp, writing several 
years after Willrich, places the success of both SALT I and lIon 
I national tecnhical means of verification (1987:186). 
Technological developments are likely to have an adverse 
I 
I effect on the verification of future arms control treaties. 
Berkowitz claims that when technology is combined with the 
weapons limits of past aras control agreements, the result is a 
I new generation of strategic weapons that will be able to evade 
traditional means of verification (1987:69). Additionally, he 
I 
I claims that current reconnaisance satellites have a limited 
ability to monitor treaty compliance because the amount of 
I 
precision needed to gather technical inforaation. To gather 
technical information, Berkowitz explains that a camera system 
must have a resolution of six inches (1987:73). Absent new 
I generations of weapons, verification of treaty compliance is 
I »the process of monitoring with reconnaisance satellites 
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I still difficult. He notes that even with the most powerful 
I 
photographic equipment, detection can be evaded by keeping an 
I object inside a building or transporting it in a nondescript 
vehicle (1987:741. Attempting to count such things as cruise 
I 
missiles and mobile missiles, were they to be an important 
component of an arms control agreement, would not be easy. This 
appears to indicate that as weapons technology has progressed 
I throughout the 1970s, verification has become more problematic. 
With increasing advances in weapons technology in the 1980s, HTHI 
I 
to verify treaty compliance may be impossible without advances in 
monitoring technology as well. 
The most recent bilateral arms control treaty has, in a 
I sense, heeded this advice to the extent that it does not rely 
exclusively on national technical means. As Secretary of State 
I 
I Schultz has noted, the Intermediate-Range Huclear Forces Treaty 
has set a precedent in verification. In addition to other means 
of surveillance, the Soviet Union and the United states have 
I agreed upon on-site inspection procedures which, Schultz claims, 
gives both sides redundant monitering capabilities and, thus, a 
I 
I double-check on treaty compliance (The INF Treaty 1988:251. This 
type of capability aids arms control to the extent that it can 
allov each nation to be certain that the treaty provisions are 
I being followed. And, as Jenson points out, cancelling an entire 
class of weapons (as the INF Treaty didl greatly simplifies the 
I 
I verification of treaty compliance (1988:193). This is because 
there are no limits to keep track of, and the launchers 
I 88 
I 
I 
I themselves are exploded. Any si9htin9 of a launcher would prove 
without a doubt that the treaty had been violated. It is 
I 
I uncertain, however, whether this type of treaty is the newest 
trend in arms control. Future arms control a9reements may rely 
on ceilin9s instead of cancellation, and the Soviets may not 
I alvays a9ree to on-site inspection. Additionally, even with the 
method of verification involved in INF, detectin9 the initial 
I number of launchers depends upon reconnaisance, and it is 
possible that a nation could have launchers stored under9round inI 
I 
order to evade initial detection. The point is, althou9h 
a9reements like INF are more conducive to aras control because 
they are easier to monitor, and thus, to verify compliance, they 
I can still be circumvented. It is too early to determine the 
extent to which IMF is verifiable.I 
I 
The technol09ical aspects of verification are politically 
important for arms control. Diehl notes that a prima facie fact 
I 
about aras control is that it involves nations who are not 
I friends, and do not have a relationship based upon trust. Yet, 
in order for arms control to succeed, each side must be assuredI that the other viII abide by the terms of the treaty (1987:7). 
Neither side can, in this type of relationship, ne90tiate vith 
the assumption that its counterpart is actin9 in 900d faith. 
I This makes ve~ification an important issue (Kaltefleiter 
1980:60). Because there is no institutional mechanism, such as a 
I 
I court of law, to enforce the contract of the treaty, an 
atmosphere of distrust exists because any violation of the 
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I contract may be a life or, death matter for a nation (Kaltefleiter 
1980:60). Diehl notes that the tension between nations need not 
I preclude success in arms control negotiations because the 
assurances of treaty verification can be a substitute for trust 
I 
I (1987:7). 
Additionally, verification is particularly important to the 
domestic constituency in the United states, as Berkowitz 
I explains: 
••• it is almost entirely an American concern in arms 
control talks. Gathering the necessary technicalI evidence of violations is not the only problem; 
American leaders must also be able to convince a 
significant part of the foreign policy bureaucracy, theI	 American public, and the public's representatives in 
Congress (1987:167). 
I Verification, in this respect, can influence public and 
congressional opinion on the treaty. 
I 
I As has been demonstrated in earlier sections, verification 
is one of the most important congressional concerns with regards 
to arms control treaties. Brown notes that congressional doubts 
I about SALT II (prior to Afghanistan) stemaed from uncertainty 
I 
about Soviet compliance and U.S. monitering capabilities
I (1987:178). Hore recently, speaking out in support of the INP 
Treaty, Senator Dole used verification as an argument to justify 
the treaty's adoption. He stated, " ••• INP is an agree.ent that 
I can be verified. Because the treaty's 'double-global-zero' 
I 
levels ease the verification problem, the intelligence chiefs I 
I consulted with assure me that, with adequate resources ••• they can 
do the verification job" (The INF Treaty 1988:7). This indicates 
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I 
I that verification capability can influence the climate of arms 
control in tha~ a lack of confidence in NTH can prevent treaty 
I 
I ratification. 
At an even more elementary level, verification, or its 
absence, can influence public support of a treaty. Public 
I support may then determine the extent to vhich the Senate and the 
President find it politically acceptable to support an arms 
I control treaty (Berkovitz 1987:69). Berkovitz claims that for 
the public to back a treaty, it must be assured that the SovietsI 
I 
have not cheated on past agreemen~s, have no~ cheated to attain 
any significant advantage, and viii not be able to cheat 
effectively on the treaty in question (1987:168). An example of 
I hov verification can affect public support for a treaty is SALT 
II. The trea~Y'8 fate came into question vhen the Iran crisisI 
I 
resulted in a loss of crucial U.S. treaty monitering facilities 
in that coun~ry. Verification became a major issue in 
congressional debate and the administration vas unable to assuage 
I ~he public panic surrounding the trea~y (Office of Research 
Coordination, CRS 1988:83). There is still some question as to 
I 
I vhether the treaty vould have been ratified absent the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. This question exists because 
verification capabilities vere uncertain. 
I Verification can be an important influence on arms control. 
When verification cannot be adequately ensured, a treaty may lose 
I 
I public and congressional support. The treaty's progress could 
come to a halt during the negotiation process i~self if 
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I negotiators do not feel that the proposal can be monitored. It 
is no accident that the major arms control agreements of the 
I century have been ones that could be easily verified (Diehl 
1987:7). Verification, then, is a substitute for trust betweenI hostile nations. 
I Perceptions of Technological Secprity pr Inaecurlty 
The next factor to be evaluated is the role of technology. 
I The effects of technology on arms control will be assessed by 
evaluating the developments themselves, as well as the manner in 
I 
I which political leaders perceive these developments to affect 
their national interest. Horris explains the role of technology 
in the arms race:
 
I Forty years' history makes it clear that technology
 
I 
itself is an independent determinant of the pace and 
direction of the arms race, quite apart from the 
intentions or hopes of politicians and strategists. 
I 
Time and again, technological breakthroughs have 
radically altered, or threatened to radically alter, 
the military balance (1988:439). 
Two key themes can be seen in this explanation: 1) technological 
I developments may complicate the policies of government officials 
and, 2) technological developments alter policymakers' 
I 
I perceptions of the military balance. Both of these themes will 
be examined. 
Technology can be seen as an obstacle to negotiating arms 
I control agreements. One reason for this, according to 
Richardson, is that the compleXity of new strategic weapons 
I technology makes it difficult for political leaders to conclude 
meaningful agreements, even in the most favorable of politicalI 
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I climates (1987:80). This may be due to an uncertainty over the 
I 
strategic implications of the new technology, which makes it 
I difficult to develop an agreement to control its use. 
Additionally, the rapid pace of technological change makes 
I 
negotiating arms control agreements frustrating due to the fact 
that it may change a country's force posture, and the influx of a 
large number of new issues makes the strategic interests of the 
I negotiating countries more difficult to ascertain (Horris 
1988:30; Hiller 1984:89). An example of technologicalI 
I 
developments complicating the arms control process can be seen in 
the SALT II negotiations. During these negotiations, changes in 
both countries' nuclear forces occurred as HIRVs, cruise 
I missiles, and Backfire bombers (in the case of the Soviets) 
entered the picture. Although President Ford and General 
I 
I Secretary Brezhnev were able to work out a framework for SALT II 
in the Vladivostok Accords of 1974, these technological advances 
complicated later negotiations for President carter (Schoenbaum 
I 1987:38; Hiller 1984:89), and before the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, there was some question in Congress as to whether it 
I 
I would be in the best strategic interests of the U.S. to ratify 
the treaty. 
An aspect of technology related to its development is where 
I the development originated. In most cases, one country 
constructs a new weapon first, and takes a temporary 
I 
I "technological lead" while its opponent rushes to duplicate the 
development. A study by the National Academy of Sciences 
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I indicates that if either side has, or is perceived to have, 
I 
technological superiority in the military area being negotiated, 
I the prospects for concluding an agreement are slim (1985:21). 
Sloss and Davis posit that the lack of progress on IMP and START 
I 
negotiations in the early 1980s was due to the fact that the 
Soviet Union felt itself to be in a position of technological 
inferiority, and as a result became rigid, defensive, and 
I belligerent in arms control negotiations (1987:20). As a result 
of a technological imbalance, or the perception that such anI 
I 
imbalance may occur, the two adversaries are most likely to 
embark on a continuous quest for newer and better technology, 
otherwise known as an arms race. Blacker notes that such 
I perceptions of a military imbalance are compounded by worst-case 
planning, in which policymakers simply assume that their opponent 
I 
I possesses a technological edge: 
It is precisely because neither side can be completely 
I 
confident in its judgment of these matters that both 
tend to assume the worst and plan accordingly. It is 
this dynamic, more than any other, that sustains the 
nuclear arms race and has made it difficult to reach 
even partial agreements to contain the military rivalry 
between the superpowers (1987:164; also HorrisI 1988:440; Brown 1987:188). 
Policymakers are not only concerned about the technological 
I aspects of military superiority, but they also assess the 
political applications of this superiority. In other words,I 
I 
behind every technological development, each side sees the other 
as attempting to achieve a position of global power for some 
nefarious purpose. Blacker explains that this fear is typical 
I behavior for adversarial nations: 
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Each superpower detects in the military activities ofI	 its rival a bid for superiority. Bach believes the 
other to be of the opinion that a nuclear war can be 
fought and won. Bach sees the arms control proposalsI	 of its adversary as insincere and calculated to produce 
one-sided military advantage. Moreover, there is 
enough evidence that can be mustered in support of 
these and related propositions to make it impossibleI for political leaders in either country to dismiss theB 
out of hand (1987:164).
I	 The implication of these concerns is that, when a 
I technological lead occurs, a nation will automatically assume that the move is calculated to make it vulnerable to a nuclear 
I attack, and thus, is not likely to be willing to conclude an arms 
I 
control agreement. Diehl notes that the weaker nation is 
I unlikely to accept inferiority, and the stronger nation will not 
make significant concessions. He concludes that attempts to 
negotiate from strength simply serve to inhibit the arms control 
I process (1987:5). Additionally, Diehl comments that a nation 
with the advantage of military superiority is not as likely to 
I consent to arms control negotiations when this advantage may 
provide greater success if used as a bargaining lever in theI 
I 
political or military arena (1987:5). 
It appears that the superpowers can only achieve success in 
I 
arms control negotiations when they perceive themselves to be at 
I a level of strategic parity. Roberts notes that although the 
parity need not be precise, "their political relationship andI economic conditions must be such that each is prepared to accept 
some encumbrance on its freedom to extend and expand its nuclear 
arsenal" (1974:4). Most of the major strategic arms limitations 
I of the past two decades have occurred when the United states and 
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I the Soviet Union perceived a relative parity to exist. As 
I 
Blacker claims, "Central to the success of the SALT process was 
I the conviction that for the time being at least, neither 
superpower was in a position either to establish or to reclaim a 
I 
position of meaningful nuclear superiority" (1987:162). 
According to Blacker, this cooperative attitude of working toward 
a mutual advantage was present during the negotiation of the ABM 
I Treaty, the 1972 Interim Agreement, and SALT II (1987:162), 
although this understanding was "called into question" by theI 
I 
time of the 1980 presidential election (1987:134). The 
presumption of parity, then, no longer existed when the 
feasibility of SALT II was called into question by Congress. INF 
I was eventually concluded on the basis of a presumption of parity, 
as well. Tucker explains:I 
I 
••• concern over an eroding military balance of power 
had eased substantially by 1988, in part because of the 
improvement since 1980 in this nation's military 
I 
posture and in part because of developments in the 
Soviet Union that made MOscow's military power appear 
less imposing and less threatening than before 
(1988:3). 
It appears that there is a relationship between the perception of 
I 
I strategic parity and an atmosphere conducive to arms control 
negotiations. It is uncertain whether this relationship is 
causal; however, it does seem highly unlikely that a nation would 
I feel motivated to negotiate if it possessed a clear advantage or 
disadvantage in military technology. 
I 
I In addition to relative parity, the effect of the weapons 
themselves on strategic stability is also important. When the 
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I nature of a particular type of weapon threatens to disrupt an 
existing parity, which the superpowers view as mutually 
I disadvantageous, then efforts to control the technology by treaty 
I may be likely. For instance, according to Schoenbaum, the shared 
suspicion of ADM technology existed prior to the negotiation of 
I
 the ABM Treaty:
 
I 
In the late 1960s, both sides independently came to 
believe that ADM systems were not only destabilizing 
but would be extremely costly to build and would 
ultimately be insufficient to protect against new 
offensive capabilities and developments such as the newI MIRVed systems (1987:34). 
This fear of developing an expensive defensive system which may
I exacerbate the dangerous race in strategic arms led the u.s. and 
I the Soviet Union to the bargaining table to begin talks on 
strategic arms limitation in November of 1969 (National Academy 
I of Sciences 1985:143). 
The combination of fear of the destabilizing technology of 
I the arms race and the shared desire to maintain a strategic 
I parity are factors which facilitate arms control. However, this 
type of situation is infrequent in the course of superpower 
I relations. According to Blacker: 
I 
In the end, it was the brief coincidence in American 
and Soviet thinking--that each saw that the other side 
recognized the futility of trying to win the nuclear 
arms race and was therefore prepared to settle for 
approximate equality--that made possible not only theI first SALT agreements but also the attempts to manage 
more effectively some of the outstanding political 
differences between the superpowers. Once the leaders 
I of both countries become convinced that their 
I 
counterparts were determined either to attain (in the 
Soviet case) or to regain (in the American case) 
meaningful military superiority, arms control and 
detente were doomed (1987:119). 
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I CONCLUSION 
These variables act together to shape the U.S. position in 
I 
I arms control negotiations. It is not possible to label specific 
factors as primary and others as secondary because the importance 
of a factor is dependent upon the overall political context in 
I which the negotiations occur. Factors which may playa leading 
role under certain circumstances may have a limited role in 
I 
I another context. 
The limitations of this paper involve the analysis of these 
variables solely from the perspective of the United States. It 
I is possible that scholars in the Soviet Union may perceive 
I 
different factors operating on arms control negotiations. 
I Further, the positions taken by the Soviet Union may also affect 
how these variables interact. However, investigating Soviet 
I 
perceptions and motivations is beyond the scope of this paper. 
One conclusion which can be drawn from this framework is 
that due to the large number of factors which can affect the 
I course of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, change must be 
incremental. No one variable has the capacity to overshadow the 
I 
I combined force exerted by the other variables. In order to 
successfully negotiate an arms control agreement, a wide range of 
conditions and influential groups must be satisfied, which makes 
I radical shifts in negotiating posture unlikely. In the long run, 
the substance and process of negotiations are not likely to 
I 
I deviate from a certain historical norms because the effect of 
these factor is to limit policy options. 
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I This paper was intended to be a brief overview of all of the 
possible factors which may influence arms control. Examples were 
I presented to clarify the importance of these factors; however, 
I the nature of this project did not permit an in-depth analysis of 
each factor nor did it enable me to make specific predictions 
I about future arms control scenarios. Such a study will be 
undertaken in the future on the basis of the framework 
I established in this paper. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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